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PERMANENT STATES OF EXCEPTION:  A 
TWO-TIERED SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COURTESY OF THE DOUBLE GOVERNMENT 
WARS ON CRIME, DRUGS & TERROR 
Thomas Anthony Durkin* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The November 2014 Valparaiso University Law School Law Review 
Symposium National Security:  Up Close and Personal contributed 
significantly to the ongoing and necessary national debate on issues 
regarding our national security response to 9/11.1  As such, it was an 
honor and privilege to be selected to participate in such an important 
discussion.  However, as I began my remarks on The Effect of Home-Grown 
Terrorism panel by wryly suggesting that perhaps the word “fear” should 
have been inserted in the title, I suggest the same here to more accurately 
state the question from the vantage point defense lawyers encounter 
defending so-called “domestic terrorism cases” in the federal courts in 
Chicago and elsewhere in the country.  From our firm’s courtroom 
                                                 
* Attorney at Law, Durkin Roberts & Grohman, Chicago, Illinois.  Distinguished 
Practitioner in Residence at the Loyola University Chicago School of Law and Co-Director 
of its National Security and Civil Rights Program.  Senior Research Fellow, Center on 
National Security, Fordham University School of Law.  B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1968; 
J.D., University of San Francisco School of Law, 1973.  Graduate Student At Large and 
Returning Scholar, University of Chicago, 2009 to the present.  Law Clerk to the Honorable 
James Parsons, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois; Assistant United States 
Attorney, Northern District of Illinois, 1978 to 1984; Fellow of the American College of Trial 
Lawyers and one of five lawyers selected nation-wide to be a participant in the John Adams 
Project, a joint collaboration of the American Civil Liberties Union and the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers to provide civilian counsel in the case of United 
States v. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed before the Military Commissions Trial Judiciary, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  See http://www.durkinroberts.com [http://perma.cc/9ATK-
D32R].  This Article would not have been possible without the research and assistance of 
Robin V. Waters, an Associate Attorney at Durkin Roberts & Grohman and Maud O. Jansen, 
a summer law clerk and student at the University of Chicago. 
1 Symposium, National Security:  Up Close and Personal, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016).  The serious scholarship also addressing this debate is voluminous.  For but a few 
examples, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK:  PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
AN AGE OF TERRORISM 2–3 (2006); DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION:  SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 1–2 (2002); 
LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM:  POWER, POLITICS, AND LIBERTY 4–5 
(2008); DAVID JENKINS, AMANDA JACOBSEN & ANDERS HENRIKSEN, THE LONG DECADE:  HOW 
9/11 CHANGED THE LAW 3–4 (2014); JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 3 (2006); ANICETO MASFERRER, POST 9/11 AND THE STATE OF 
PERMANENT LEGAL EMERGENCY:  SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN COUNTERING TERRORISM 
1 (2012). 
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vantage point, it is the effect of the fear of homegrown terrorism that seems 
to be prevailing, surely not homegrown terrorism itself.2 
However, fear is hardly something new to federal criminal 
practitioners.  As I have argued elsewhere, fear driven war rhetoric 
legislation has already caused considerable damage to procedural due 
process rights by gradual judicial acquiescence in federal criminal 
prosecutions, and civil liberties in general, well in advance of 9/11. 3  Thus, 
I would like to build on this theme and argue that a continuous thread of 
gradual judicial acquiescence to fear generated by purported national 
emergencies—or if you will, “states of exception”—can be seen to weave 
its way through both the War on Crime and the War on Drugs.  This 
gradual judicial acquiescence, albeit in the face of congressional legislation 
designed to thwart grave danger perceived to be destroying our inner 
cities, greased the skids, so to speak, for continued deference to the 
executive branch’s far more legitimate emergency measures in response 
to the events of 9/11.  When it now comes to our Symposium topic of 
“homegrown” national security cases in the federal criminal courts, it is 
somewhat disingenuous not to acknowledge that a growing two-tiered 
system of procedural due process is becoming the everyday reality. 
In doing so, a careful analysis of the insightful scholarship of Professor 
Michael J. Glennon of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts 
with respect to his recent article and book on national security and double 
                                                 
2 See also JOHN MUELLER, TERRORISM SINCE 9/11:  THE AMERICAN CASES 1 (2015).  Indeed, 
as Professor Mueller points out a careful analysis of the actual threat terrorism poses reveals 
that an American has a one in 3.5 million chance of perishing at the hands of a terrorist.  Id. 
at 30.  To contextualize this figure with approximations, the risk of becoming a victim of 
homicide is one in 22,000; the risk of being killed in an automobile accident is one in 8000; 
and the risk of dying from cancer is one in 500.  Obviously, the fear of such an attack far 
outweighs the actual risk, which only brings the urgency to analyze our national security 
choices into greater focus.  MUELLER, supra note 2, at 22. 
3 See Thomas A. Durkin, Apocalyptic War Rhetoric:  Drugs, Narco-Terrorism, and a Federal 
Court Nightmare From Here to Guantanamo, 2 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 257, 258–59 
(2012) (discussing the fear politicians face about the way the public perceives their decisions 
made in regard to the war on terror); see also JAY FELDMAN, MANUFACTURING HYSTERIA:  A 
HISTORY OF SCAPEGOATING, SURVEILLANCE, AND SECRECY IN MODERN AMERICA xvii (2011) 
(reviewing fear driven rhetoric in World War I).  The Pen American Center opined that:  
Precisely because it is legitimized via fear one can claim that “the war 
against terror” is a greater danger to democracy than terrorism 
itself . . . We can perhaps say, along with the philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben that we live today in a permanent state of emergency, where 
the reference to serious dangers almost works like a trump card—and 
the card trumps recognized democratic rights. 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Pen American Center in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction and in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 21, ACLU v. Clapper, 2013 
WL 5221583 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13 Civ. 3994). 
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government will become a cornerstone.4  It was Professor Glennon’s 
observations on the theme of “double government” that confirmed my 
own courtroom intuition and growing suspicion that this two-tiered 
system of procedural due process was developing right before my eyes.5 
Implicit in this entire analysis and critical to any assessment of our 
Symposium’s national security conversation, is the very question of the 
judiciary’s ability to uphold the Constitution and rule of law.  Rather than 
trying to shoehorn these emergencies into the rule of law, it will be argued 
that judges would do the country a far better service by conceding that 
they cannot do their job, in some instances involving domestic national 
security prosecutions, while the country goes through these emergencies 
or states of exception.6  A singular, but concrete example of a consequence 
of this “state of exception,” in the contextual setting of a traditional Fourth 
Amendment challenge in Franks v. Delaware to a search warrant 
authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) recently 
decided in the widely publicized Seventh Circuit interlocutory opinion in 
the case of United States v. Daoud, will be analyzed.7  This analysis will offer 
an insight into how a routine procedural due process Fourth Amendment 
challenge to search warrants can literally be read out of play in a FISA 
search warrant, based solely upon the untested certification of the 
Attorney General that national security will be harmed by the disclosure 
of the search warrant materials to the defense.  Of particular note will be 
Judge Ilana Diamond Rovner’s forthright concurring opinion in Daoud 
that concedes that Franks cannot be squared with FISA.8 
                                                 
4 See Michael J. Glennon, National Security and Double Government, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 
1, 1 (2014) (introducing the “double government” theory); see also MICHAEL J. GLENNON, 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DOUBLE GOVERNMENT 4 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015) (explaining the 
rational actor model and the government politics model and introducing the idea that neither 
of these models are ideal in addressing national security issues). 
5 Glennon’s “double government” theme has also been referred to by other 
commentators as “the shadows.”  TOM ENGELHARDT, SHADOW GOVERNMENT:  
SURVEILLANCE, SECRET WARS, AND A GLOBAL SECURITY STATE IN A SINGLE-SUPERPOWER 
WORLD 17–18 (2014); SCOTT HORTON, LORDS OF SECRECY:  THE NATIONAL SECURITY ELITE AND 
AMERICA’S STEALTH WARFARE 87 (2015). 
6 This insight has been suggested by Professor David Dyzenhaus in his thoughtful work, 
The Constitution of Law:  Legality in a Time of Emergency.  While speaking in the context of the 
U.K.’s Emergency Act of 1937, Dyzenhaus admits that it could be the case that courts are no 
longer capable of doing their job of “maintaining the integrity of the legal order”  DAVID 
DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW:  LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 33 (2006). 
7 See United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 483–84 (7th Cir. 2014) (analyzing the decision 
made in Franks and its applicability in the FISA context case); see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154, 171–73 (1978). 
8 See Daoud, 755 F.3d at 486–87 (describing why Franks cannot operate under the FISA 
context). 
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Finally, going a step further than Professor Glennon, as well as 
running the risk of overstepping my trial lawyer area of expertise by 
delving into the fields of legal and political theory, the proposition will be 
briefly advanced if this two-tiered system of justice might well be logically 
inherent in the very structure of our constitutional democracy.  This 
expansion can only happen if one is willing to step outside the normal 
rhetoric of current national security case law which, at best, often pays 
only lip service to the rule of law, and dares to engage both the work of 
Carl Schmitt, Clinton Rossiter, Georgio Agamben, and other political and 
legal theorists with respect to their scholarly views on Schmitt’s famous 
premise that “[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception.”9 
This exercise necessarily entails a brief exploration into the 
relationship of the “state of exception” to sovereignty, and raises the 
difficult and ambiguous constitutional question implicit in Professor 
Glennon’s double government theory as to the current locus of 
sovereignty in the United States insofar as declaring, implementing, and 
continuing our global war on terror that appears to have no realistic end 
in sight.  The serious implications of the answer to this question, which by 
definition necessarily spills over into national security prosecutions in the 
federal courts, presents for Glennon nothing less than an question as to 
the very type of government with which we shall be left, which, I suggest, 
also must include whether we truly wish to continue to default our way 
into a two-tiered system of criminal justice in the federal courts. 
The same question was also raised, with a bit of a twist, at an earlier 
national security symposium in 2006 at the University of Georgia by Texas 
Law Professor Sanford Levinson.10  In a thought provoking symposium 
article analyzing the constitutional ramifications of Schmitt’s “state of 
exception” as it pertains to the future of our overall constitutional 
democracy, Professor Levinson poignantly asked whether it might be 
possible to have “an [a]dult [c]onversation” about Schmitt and this 
complex sovereignty problem so that an intelligent decision might be 
made as to the very kind of political order in which we wish to live.11  
Whether that conversation has or can be had is anyone’s guess.  However, 
some seven years later, it is respectfully suggested that Professor 
Levinson’s “adult conversation” appears to go on, if at all, only among 
academic elites, as it seems conspicuously absent in most national security 
                                                 
9 CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY:  FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY xviii, 5 (George Schwab trans., 2005). 
10 See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L. 
REV. 699, 701–02 (2006) (addressing the national security interests and introduction to 
morality). 
11 See id. at 748–50. 
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opinions of the judiciary, the halls of Congress, the White House, or for 
that matter, among lawyers and most certainly not in very many law 
schools.  It is the hope that this Article might, in some small way, continue 
to spur such an adult conversation, as the constitutional stakes both 
Glennon and Levinson raise are nothing less than foundational. 
II.  FEDERAL DOMESTIC NATIONAL SECURITY PROSECUTIONS & GLENNON’S 
DOUBLE GOVERNMENT REVELATIONS 
According to a July 2014 publication co-authored by the Columbia 
Law School Human Rights Institute and Human Rights Watch, between 
2002 and 2011, almost 500 individuals were convicted of terrorism, or 
terrorism-related offenses in the United States, and the federal 
government charged an average of about forty individuals every year.12  
As also noted by the report, these post-9/11 terrorism cases are 
disconcerting for the changes, practices, and procedures they have 
brought to the federal system: 
Terrorism cases in the US since September 11, 2001[,] have 
raised serious fair trial concerns.  This is largely due to 
investigative and detention tactics that occur prior to trial 
including prolonged solitary confinement during pretrial 
detention, as well as procedural impediments imposed by 
the US Congress or courts; use of prejudicial evidence 
such as evidence obtained through coercion; classified 
evidence obtained by warrantless wiretaps that cannot be 
fairly contested; and inflammatory evidence, including 
evidence about terrorism in non-terrorism cases that 
unfairly plays on jurors’ fears.13 
I hardly needed Columbia or Human Rights Watch to tell me things 
were out of whack in national security prosecutions in the federal courts.  
My first suspicion that something was seriously remiss in criminal 
prosecutions in the name of national security began in Guantanamo Bay.  
A day or two before my client, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and his four co-
conspirators—including alleged master-mind Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed—were arraigned in the capital conspiracy case in the Military 
Commissions for plotting the 9/11 attacks, several civilian defense 
counsels and I were standing in line outside a trailer office waiting to 
                                                 
12 Illusion of Justice:  Human Rights Abuses in U.S. Terrorism Prosecutions, COLUM. L. SCH. 
HUM. RTS. INST. & HUM. RTS. WATCH 13 (July 21, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/reports/ 
2014/07/21/illusion-justice-0 [http://perma.cc/E8C7-4GYR]. 
13 Id. at 76.  
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obtain credentials.14  We struck up a conversation with one or two of the 
prosecutors from the Office of Military Commissions (“OMC”), but the 
prosecutors seemed unwilling or unable to answer even the most basic 
questions about the case.  In the course of the next few days, this pattern 
of unwillingness or inability to answer typical questions that prosecutors 
and defense counsel routinely share among themselves struck me as odd, 
but I dismissed it due to the seriousness of the case, OMC hierarchy, and 
the massive world-wide media attention it was attracting.15 
Additionally, the same sense of uneasiness and prosecutorial double-
speak began to raise its head in the domestic terrorism cases in which we 
became involved in the federal court in Chicago.  Prosecutors from the 
Chicago U.S. Attorney’s Office, with whom we work on a regular basis 
and share a significant amount of trust lawyer-to-lawyer, began reacting 
the same way as the guys in the credential line in the Guantanamo Military 
Commissions.  Rudimentary questions that would readily be answered in 
regular federal criminal prosecutions would more and more be met with 
the answer:  “Not sure, I’ll have to get back to you.”  Over time, it 
gradually became clear to us that either the local line-assistant prosecutors 
                                                 
14 On January 21, 2010, Susan L. Crawford, the Convening Authority for the Military 
Commissions, dismissed all the charges.  See Letter from Susan J. Crawford, Convening 
Authority for Military Commissions, Regarding the Direction of the Convening Authority 
(Jan. 21, 2010) (reporting all charges against the named defendants are withdrawn and 
dismissed without prejudice).  The group was then indicted in the Southern District of New 
York in United States v. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.  See Indictment, United States v. Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed, (S14) 93-CR-180 (KTD).  The case was subsequently brought back to the 
Military Commission in Guantanamo.  See Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal Hearing at 1, United States v. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, (S14) 93-CR-180 (KTD) 
(2007) (ISN No. 10013). 
15 See, e.g., Sylvain Cypel, Le “Cerveau” Présumé du 11 Septembre Veut Mourir En Martyr 
[The presumed “brains” of 9/11 wants to die a martyr], LE MONDE (June 6, 2008, 11:35 AM), 
http://www.lemonde/fr/elections-americaines/article/2008/06/06/le-cerveau-presume-
du-11-septembre-veut-mourir-en-martyr_1054552_829254.html [http://perma.cc/2PRW-
Z96X] (demonstrating the world-wide media attention); William Glaberson, 9/11 Suspects 
Arraigned at Guantánamo Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2008), http://nytimes.com/ 
2008/06/05/washington/05cnd-gitmo.html [http://perma.cc/256C-8328] (summarizing 
imprisonment and subsequent arraignment of the five detainees); Louise Radnofsky & 
Allegra Stratton, Profiles:  Guantánamo Trial, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2008), http://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2008/jun/05/alqaida.guantanamo1 [http://perma.cc/TZN6-XZKL] 
(profiling the five men charged in connection with the 9/11 attacks); Carol Rosenberg, 
Alleged 9/11 Architect:  Martyr Me, MIAMI HERALD (June 6, 2008), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/ 
article1929229.html [http://perma.cc/L7NV-3U7H] (illustrating the events of the hearing 
where five accused 9/11 co-conspirators each independently rejected free American 
lawyers); Josh White, 9/11 Architect Tells Court He Hopes for Martyrdom, WASH. POST (June 6, 
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/05/AR200806 
0500305.html [http://perma.cc/TV3V-NB56] (discussing the position of Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed in regard to the allegation of his involvement with the 9/11 attacks). 
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themselves did not know the answers to the questions, or even if they did, 
they were not permitted to respond to questions without permission.  
Clearly something significantly different was happening in these cases.  It 
was not until reading Glennon’s double government article, National 
Security and Double Government, that I finally began making sense out of 
my increasing uneasiness over what was happening with respect to who 
was actually running these prosecutions.  In the article’s first page 
abstract, Professor Glennon caught my attention.  As he bluntly stated: 
The public believes that the constitutionally-established 
institutions control national security policy, but that view 
is mistaken.  Judicial review is negligible; congressional 
oversight is dysfunctional; and presidential control is 
nominal.  Absent a more informed and engaged 
electorate, little possibility exists for restoring 
accountability in the formulation and execution of 
national security policy.16 
It suddenly occurred to me that if presidential control over national 
security policy was nominal, why should anyone think that the 
prosecutorial control by the Chicago U.S. Attorney’s Office was any 
different?  In posing the question as to why national security policy would 
remain constant through the Obama Administration, notwithstanding the 
newly elected President’s forceful criticism on the campaign trail, Glennon 
suggests that “[a] disquieting answer is provided by the theory that 
Walter Bagehot suggested in 1867 to explain the evolution of the English 
Constitution.”17  Citing Bagehot’s classic, The English Constitution, 
Glennon lays out Bagehot’s comparison between Britain’s “‘dignified’ 
institutions” versus its “efficient” organizations that together comprised a 
“disguised republic.”18  As Glennon puts it, Bagehot’s disguised republic 
“obscures the massive shift in power that has occurred, which if widely 
                                                 
16 Glennon, supra note 4, at 1–2.  With the exception of one example of recent disclosure 
of dysfunctional congressional oversight, consider the congressional oversight of U.S. drone 
strikes, where the full legal basis for those strikes is withheld from the public.  See Richard 
Weir, Accountability on Drones Continues to Fall Short, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. (Aug. 12, 2015), 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/accountability-drones-continues-fall-
short [https://perma.cc/7CD7-D7HD] (“Currently, congressional committees tasked with 
oversight of the program do not even have access to all of the administration’s 
interpretations of relevant law.  Since 2010, members of the Senate intelligence committee 
have requested the release of all the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinions to targeted killing 
operations.  Only four—of what is believed to be at least nine opinions—have been shared.”). 
17 Glennon, supra note 4, at 10. 
18 Id. at 11–12. 
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understood would create a crisis in public confidence.”19  In short, 
Glennon explained that it is the latter “‘efficient’ institutions” (the House 
of Commons, the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister) that Bagehot suggested 
did the real work of governing—not the “‘dignified’ institutions” (the 
monarchy and the House of Lords).20  Turning to the United States, 
Glennon acknowledges that as was the case in the early days of Britain’s 
monarchy, power also originally lay in the hands of America’s “‘dignified’ 
institutions”—the President, Congress, and the courts.21  While many 
Americans may well still believe these dignified institutions are the seat 
of governmental power, Glennon posits—consistent with our courtroom 
experience—that insofar as national security decisions are concerned, the 
public is sadly mistaken.22  Justifying his sense of how disquieting things 
have become, Glennon puts things rather bluntly again: 
[W]hen it comes to defining and protecting national 
security . . . America’s efficient institution makes most of 
the key decisions concerning national security, removed 
from public view and from the constitutional restrictions 
that check America’s dignified institutions.23 
Glennon straightforwardly claims that the United States “moved beyond 
a mere imperial presidency to a bifurcated system—a structure of double 
government—in which even the President now exercises little substantive 
control over the overall direction of U.S. national security policy.”24  
Glennon advances the Bagehot analogy by describing America’s 
“dignified” institutions as “Madisonian[s]” while calling the United States 
“efficient” institutions as “Trumanite[s].”25  These he describes as a 
“network of several hundred high-level military, intelligence, diplomatic, 
and law enforcement officials within the Executive Branch who are 
responsible for national security policymaking.”26  Giving President 
                                                 
19 Id. at 11. 
20 See id. at 10–11 (asserting a difference between “‘dignified’ institutions” and “‘efficient’ 
institutions” as it pertains to governing).  Glennon points out that Bagehot explained that the 
Monarchy and House of Lords were “dignified” in that they provide a link to the past, excite 
the public imagination, and exercise a hold on the public mind by evoking the grandeur of 
past ages through theatrical show, pomp, and historical symbolism.  Id. 
21 See id. at 12 (discussing the distribution of power in the early United States as compared 
to early Britain). 
22 See Glennon, supra note 9, at 12 (illustrating the skewed viewpoint among Americans 
relating to national security). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 See id. at 17–18 (categorizing the differing approaches and viewpoints as “Madisonian” 
and “Trumanite”). 
26 Id. at 18. 
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Truman this appellation is no accident.27  Glennon explains in 
considerable historical detail Truman’s founding role in the creation of the 
modern American national security state, and the passage of the historic 
National Security Act of 1947 (“the Act”).28  As Glennon explains further, 
it is the Act that “unified the military under a new Secretary of Defense, 
set up the CIA, created the modern Joint Chiefs of Staff, and established 
the National Security Council . . . .”29  The Act also established the 
National Security Agency.30  Citing a landmark 2011 Washington Post 
study of the Act’s growth, Glennon illustrates that there are now at least 
forty-six federal departments and agencies engaged in national security 
work with millions of employees and a total annual budget outlay of 
around $1 trillion.31 
Importantly, Glennon goes on to discuss how this double government 
was not a diabolical conspiracy, but instead, part of the same structural 
inheritance from the British of our adopted form of a constitutional 
republic.32  Differing from Bagehot, however, Glennon demonstrates that 
our double government evolved in plain sight and is more structural than 
purposeful.33  Glennon’s point, as to the structure, is worth quoting in full: 
Nonetheless, in the United States today, as in Bagehot’s 
Britain, “[m]ost do indeed vaguely know that there are 
                                                 
27 See id. (explaining how President Truman is largely responsible for creating the United 
States’ “‘efficient’ national security apparatus”). 
28 See Glennon, supra note 9, at 19–21 (describing Truman’s role in the origin of the efficient 
security state). 
29 Id. at 18. 
30 Id. 
31 See id. at 22 (accounting for the number of federal departments and agencies in the 
United States and the budget that accompanies national security work).  Considerable 
scholarship, far beyond the scope of this Article, has been devoted to the National Security 
Act of 1947 and its ramifications.  However, a basic understanding of the Act, its impact on 
present day America and our national security apparatus in general, is essential in 
attempting to grasp the national security world in which we find ourselves today even 
insofar as prosecutions in the name of national security are concerned.  See generally MICHAEL 
J. HOGAN, A CROSS OF IRON:  HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
STATE, 1945–1954 65 (1998) (indicating that the National Security Act of 1947 “established the 
modern mechanisms of the national security state”); IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF:  THE NEW 
DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 8–10 (2013) (examining the New Deal and analyzing the 
results of illiberal alliances); JOHN LUKACS, THE LEGACY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 189–91 
(2010) (analyzing post-World War II America); JAMES T. SPARROW, WARFARE STATE:  WORLD 
WAR II AMERICANS AND THE AGE OF BIG GOVERNMENT 42–43 (2011) (discussing Roosevelt’s 
administration, the New Deal, and the building of “an arsenal of democracy”). 
32 See Glennon, supra note 4, at 45 (explaining that, as in Bagehot’s Britain, there are 
institutions involved in the governance of the United States that were not established by the 
constitution). 
33 See id. at 45–46 (noting that the evolution of America’s double government has not been 
purposeful, but a response to society’s needs). 
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some other institutions” involved in governance besides 
those established by the Constitution.  But the popular 
conception of an “invisible government,” “state within,” 
or “national security state” is off the mark.  The existence 
of the Trumanite network is no secret.  The network’s 
emergence has not been the result of an enormous, 
nefarious conspiracy conceived to displace constitutional 
government.  The emergence of the Trumanite network 
has not been purposeful.  America’s dual national 
security framework has evolved gradually in response to 
incentives woven into the system’s structure as that 
structure has reacted to society’s felt needs.  Yet, as a 
whole, Americans still do not recognize the extent to 
which Madisonian institutions have come to formulate 
national security policy in form more than in substance.34 
As part and parcel of these structural incentives, Glennon goes on in a 
section entitled “The Reality of Madisonian Weakness” to explain quite 
cogently how while it appears that the President, Congress, and the courts 
set national security policy, “in reality their role is minimal.”35  Taking 
issue with Harvard Professor Jack Goldsmith’s proposition that “[t]he 
main virtue of the [checks and balances] system lies in its ability to self-
correct[,]” Glennon says instead that all three branches “exercise 
decisional authority more in form than in substance.”36  Sadly, Glennon’s 
conclusion, rather than Goldsmith’s, seems closer to reality from our 
courtroom experience; but it would be foolhardy to question Professor 
Goldsmith’s prolific and serious scholarly contributions to the national 
security debate, albeit from his quite different perspective of government 
service.37 
                                                 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 46. 
36 Id. at 46 n.242. 
37 See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY:  LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 9–11 (2007) (narrating Smith’s experiences as the Head of the 
Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Customary International Law and Federal Common Law:  A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 815, 816–17 (1997) (challenging the modern position that customary 
international law has the status of federal common law); Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy 
and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667, 1668–69 (2003) (examining forms of criticism 
targeted at the United States regarding its failure to take affirmative action to help other 
nations, and critiquing the cosmopolitan duty argument); Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating 
International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (2003) (arguing that the current 
organization of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) is unacceptable and laying out the 
mechanism that make ICC futile and perverse); Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs 
Preemption, 200 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 176–77 (2001) (analyzing issues concerning statutory 
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Certainly if Glennon’s theory of double government is correct, and the 
President himself now exercises little substantive control over the overall 
direction of national security policy, it is understandable why local 
prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s Offices, under the umbrella of his 
Department of Justice, were incapable of exercising control over domestic 
national security prosecutions.38  Over time, and the more domestic 
national security cases we took on,39 this became so clear to us that we 
took the liberty to inform District Court trial judges that we would no 
longer call the local U.S. Attorney’s Office and its Assistants “the 
government.”40  Instead, we would hereafter simply refer to them in our 
pleadings as “the prosecutors.” 
While, of course, some of this banter was tongue-in-cheek courtroom 
theatrics, there may be more to this observation than meets the eye.  First 
and foremost, it is our experience that very few people involved in the 
practice of federal criminal law—and this might well include many 
judges—are aware that the National Security Division of the Department 
of Justice (“NSD”) does not report to the Assistant Attorney General of the 
Criminal Division, as would occur in every other federal criminal 
prosecution.41  It is of no small consequence to this discussion that the 
Department of Justice Counterterrorism and Counterespionage Sections 
were taken out of the Criminal Division chain of command and merged 
into a newly created National Security Division as part of the USA 
                                                 
foreign affairs preemption and arguing that an interpretive canon favoring federal foreign 
affairs interests is warranted). 
38 Glennon, supra note 9, at 12 (“The United States has, in short, moved beyond a mere 
imperial presidency to a bifurcated system—a structure of double government—in which 
even the President now exercises little substantive control over the overall direction of U.S. 
national security policy.”). 
39 To date, our firm has been involved in the following national security or “domestic 
terrorism” cases in federal district courts since 9/11:  United States v. Abdelhaleem Ashqar, 
03-CR-978 (N.D. Ill. 2005); United States v. Raja Lahrasib Khan, 10-CR-240 (N.D. Ill. 2012); 
United States v. Basaaly Moalin, 10-CR-4246 (S.D. Cal. 2013); United States v. Shaker Masri, 
10-CR-655 (N.D. Ill. 2012); United States v. Adel Daoud, 12-CR-723 (N.D. Ill. 2014); United 
States v. Mohammed Khan, 14-CR-564 (N.D. Ill. 2012).  Notable Cases, DURKIN ROBERTS & 
GROHMAN, http://www.durkinroberts.com/notable-cases/ [http://perma.cc/5NBE-
KYUH].  
40  Defendant’s Consolidated Reply in Support of His Pretrial Motions, United States v. 
Adel Daoud, 12-CR-723, 2014 WL 321384 (N.D. Ill. 2014).  
41 See U.S. Dep’t of Just., National Security Division Progress Report, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 
NAT’L SECURITY DIVISION 2–3 (Apr. 2008), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
nsd/legacy/2014/07/23/nsd-progress-rpt-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/XHJ9-YAVR] 
(showing the Justice Department National Security Structure after the creation of the 
National Security Division). 
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PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2006.42  This Act 
created the Senate confirmation position of Assistant Attorney General 
(“AAG”) for National Security.43  This chain of command bypasses the 
AAG of the Criminal Division, and requires the approval of the Director 
of National Intelligence (“DNI”) before the Presidential recommendation 
for appointment.44 
Further, also hidden in Glennon’s plain sight, every national security 
or domestic terrorism prosecution must be approved and supervised by the 
same AAG of the National Security Division who was approved by the 
DNI.45  The AAG remains as a “supervisory authority over the conduct of 
the case from its inception until its conclusion, including appeal.”46  The 
U.S. Attorneys’ manual also mandates that line assistants must receive 
“express authorization of the National Security Division [(“NSD”)] or 
higher authority” to institute a case involving national security, and the 
NSD must be consulted: 
[B]efore an arrest is made, a search warrant is obtained, a 
grand jury investigation is commenced, immunity is 
offered, an indictment is presented, an information filed, 
or a civil injunctive action is filed, a prosecution is 
declined, a count is dismissed, a sentencing commitment 
                                                 
42 See id. (depicting the changes to the Justice Department National Security Structure as 
part of USA PATRIOT Act, which eliminated the counterespionage and counterterrorism 
sections). 
43 See id. at 2 (noting that Congress established the National Security Division as part of 
the PATRIOT Act, which is led by the Assistant Attorney General for National Security). 
44 See Exec. Order No. 12333(1.1)(d)(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), 
https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/eo12333.html#2.5 [https://perma.cc/PDV9-HZXR] 
(explaining the approval process).  The Executive Order states: 
The relevant department head shall consult with the Director [of 
National Security] before appointing an individual to fill a vacancy or 
recommending to the President an individual be nominated to fill a 
vacancy in any of the following positions:  the Under Secretary for 
Defense for Intelligence; the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency; uniformed heads of the intelligence elements of the Army, the 
Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps above the rank of Major 
General or Rear Admiral; the Assistant Commandant of the Coast 
Guard for Intelligence; and the Assistant Attorney General for National 
Security. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
45 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-90.100, 
http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-90000-national-security [https://perma.cc/J5PU-
76RS] (“[A]ll criminal cases relating to activities directed against the national security, as well 
as collateral offenses such as perjury that arise out of such activities, are to be supervised by 
the Assistant Attorney General (AAG), National Security Division.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
46 Id. 
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or other disposition is made, or an adverse ruling or 
decision is appealed . . . .47 
In short, this laundry list constitutes nearly every conceivable 
prosecutorial decision normally made by the U.S. Attorney’s Office.48  
Thus, it may not necessarily be mere tongue-in-cheek criticism to suggest 
that local line assistant federal prosecutors assigned to a national security 
case are completely beholden to the AGG and the NSD, and indirectly the 
DNI, when it comes to the approval of every aspect of a domestic national 
security prosecution.  This is of no small moment on a number of levels.  
First and foremost, major city U.S. Attorney’s Offices such as the Southern 
and Eastern Districts of New York (New York City and Brooklyn), the 
Central District of California (Los Angeles) and the Northern District of 
Illinois (Chicago), have always prided themselves as being largely 
independent of the Department of Justice and Glennon’s bureaucrats.  
Among practitioners, these offices are considered the premier offices in 
the country; and due to the volume and sophistication of the prosecutions, 
deservedly receive a considerable amount of respect and deference both 
from Washington and the judges in the districts in which they practice. 
This independence, respect, and deference cuts a number of ways, but 
is critical to the overall daily operation of the federal criminal justice 
system.  Defense lawyers and prosecutors necessarily must come to trust 
each other—or at least those lawyers considered trustworthy on both 
sides.49  The everyday operation of the system requires that a relatively 
free flow of information exists between the parties.  Plea agreements 
would come to a standstill if discovery cannot be readily produced and a 
prosecutor’s word would be taken at face value regarding what else might 
be involved in the case.50  Likewise, no agreement to cooperate could ever 
exist if the defense lawyer’s assessment of the credibility of the client or 
his or her willingness to cooperate could not be taken at face value.51 
                                                 
47 Id. at 9-90.020.  Assistants must also consult with the Counterintelligence and Export 
Control Section (“CES”) of the National Security Division, in cases involving classified 
information (governed by the Classified Information Procedures Act).  Id. 
48 See id.  
49 Unfortunately, trustworthiness is not a universal trait with violators on both sides of 
the equation.  Nevertheless, like every good prosecutor comes to learn which defense 
lawyers can be trusted, the same is true on the defense side.  Nor is this trustworthiness a 
sign of weakness, something some defense lawyers regrettably confuse with the ability to 
defend a client zealously. 
50 See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and Plea Bargaining:  What’s Discovery Got to Do With It?, 23 
CRIM. JUST. 28, 30 (2008) (advocating for “open file” discovery and explaining that such 
discovery policies would result in guilty pleas being entered into earlier). 
51 The entire issue of cooperation with the government raises the hackles of some defense 
lawyers who pride themselves as never representing “cooperators.”  In the author’s 
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This same everyday level of trust necessarily comes to exist between 
the lawyers and the court.  For many of the same reasons that trust comes 
to exist between the lawyers, judges likewise need to rely upon the word 
of the lawyers before them.  Just like a prosecutor must rely on the word 
of a defense lawyer that he or she wants to resolve the case without the 
need for a trial, judges need to be able to rely upon the word of the lawyers 
for each party whether a plea or trial is likely, what the issues are in the 
case, how long the case will take, that witnesses are being put on without 
the subornation of perjury and the like.  The everyday functioning of the 
system requires that and more.  While many defense lawyers would claim, 
with reasonable cause, that most federal judges too often rely upon the 
word of the government prosecutors in any kind of case, it is submitted 
that this cynicism is becoming well founded in cases brought in the name 
of national security.  One reason for this problem may lie in an issue 
Glennon mentions early in his article while addressing the Obama 
Administration’s approach to multiple national security issues as being 
essentially the same approach as the Bush Administration, including the 
Bush Administration’s CIA programs and operations.52  In reciting these 
similarities, Glennon notes that while his article only considers national 
security policy, it is important to understand that “elements of national 
security policy bear directly upon U.S. foreign policy generally and, 
indeed, upon domestic policy.”53  Glennon labels what he calls the 
“Bush/Obama view” and suggests this view considers “homeland 
                                                 
experience, however, these lawyers are either good liars or always have a close associate to 
whom they can quickly refer the many clients in whose interest it is to cooperate.  Regardless, 
a considerable portion of the everyday practice of federal criminal law requires discussions 
back and forth between the defense lawyer and prosecutor over what is commonly known 
as a “proffer.”  A proffer, short for “proffer of testimony,” can be done either directly by the 
client pursuant to a “proffer letter” issued by the prosecutor offering a limited form of 
immunity; or through what is known as an “attorney proffer” where the defense attorney 
tells the prosecutor what the client would say if he or she were to testify.  The latter cannot 
be used in any fashion against the client, unlike the limited immunity offered in a proffer 
letter whose limited immunity is more often swallowed by the exceptions.  As a result, 
experienced defense practitioners usually only permit attorney proffers with respect to any 
client that may still wish to proceed to trial.  This process, therefore, requires considerable 
give and take between lawyers. 
52 See Glennon, supra note 4, at 2–4 (listing the many issues the Bush Administration 
practiced and the Obama Administration continues to practice:  sending terrorism suspects 
overseas for detention and interrogation; claiming the power to hold American citizens 
accused of terrorism without trial in military confinement; insisting that the President 
decides whether an accused terrorist will be tried by a civilian court or military tribunal; 
keeping the military prison at Guantanamo Bay open; arguing that detainees cannot 
challenge the conditions of their confinement; restricting detainees’ access to counsel; 
resisting efforts to extend the right of habeas corpus to other off-shore prisons; arguing that 
detainees cannot invoke the Geneva Convention). 
53 Id. at 2 n.2. 
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security [as] the be-all and end-all of grand [foreign policy] strategy” that 
“required maintaining ‘the security apparatus that supported drone 
attacks on Al Qaeda targets’ in countries such as Yemen, which in turn has 
shaped U.S. engagement in the Middle East and the muted U.S. response 
to the Arab Spring.”54 
Blurring the distinctions between modern national security, foreign 
policy and domestic policy from the idea of national security being more 
or less an issue belonging to the sphere of the military to a broader 
strategic concept has been traced to the post-World War II issue of 
obtaining “freedom from foreign dictation.”55  This evolution has been 
attributed to a variety of causes, including the introduction of “total war” 
brought about by the two World Wars of the Twentieth Century, along 
with the complete mobilization of the citizenry for manpower which, in 
turn, could be said to also blur the distinction between “the battle front 
and the home front, as well as between combatants and non-
combatants.”56  As such, the idea of “total war” may well have been 
captured best shortly after World War II by President Truman in his 
memoirs, which also shines considerable light on the reasons behind 
pushing for the creation of the National Security Act of 1947, and perhaps, 
his comfort level with the decision to drop the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki: 
[W]e live in an age when . . . there are no longer sharp 
distinctions between combatants and noncombatants, 
between military targets and the sanctuary of civilian 
areas.  Nor can we separate the economic facts from the 
problems of defense and security.  [The] 
President . . . must be able to act at all times to meet any 
sudden threat to the nation’s security.57 
Here, it appears, Glennon, and commentators such as Gross and Ní 
Aoláin, get to the very nub of the problem created by the peculiarities of 
our modern global war on terror, national security emergencies and the 
current confusion that gets put in the lap of District Court Judges when it 
comes to these domestic national security cases.  While it is rather obvious 
that both the War on Crime and the War on Drugs had political overtones 
driven by thinly disguised “tough on crime” emergency-like 
demagoguery, it was one thing for the courts to stand up and be counted 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN THE TIME OF CRISIS:  EMERGENCY POWERS 
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 215 (2006). 
56 Id. at 216. 
57 Id. at 217. 
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on every now and then to apply traditional Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, or Eighth 
Amendment issues in that setting.  Certainly, better late than never, the 
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker declared the mandatory 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional, which is a classic example of 
some judicial backbone in this regard.58 
When it comes to a global war on terror, however, and 
notwithstanding several Supreme Court decisions against the government 
in the context of Guantanamo, government losses are few and far between 
in the domestic courtroom realm.59  While it may well be one thing to 
stand up every now and then to executive and congressional 
demagoguery over more traditional criminal prosecutions involving 
drugs or street crime, it seems rather too much to expect that judges 
would, or even perhaps should, be expected to do the same thing in the 
context of something as dire as the very security of the homeland, 
something inextricably mixed up in our minds with foreign policy and 
traditional concepts of war, military might, and existential threats, real or 
imagined.  This concept is no doubt frothy stuff, and the conflation and 
confusion of fear generated issues—existential or otherwise—is good 
fodder for demagoguery over “national security,” which seems to have 
succeeded. 
III.  A CASE STUDY FOR A TWO-TIERED SYSTEM:  UNITED STATES V. DAOUD 
In United States v. Daoud, Judge Rovner, writing in her concurring 
opinion, stated: 
                                                 
58 543 U.S. 220, 258 (2005). 
59 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771–72 (2008) (discussing that the constitutional 
privilege of habeas corpus extends to noncitizens held in Guantanamo, and the Military 
Commissions Act did not provide an adequate habeas substitute and constitutes an unlawful 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567, 650 (2006) 
(holding the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 did not strip the United States Supreme Court 
of jurisdiction to hear cases being tried before military commissions, and the Bush 
Administration’s Military Commissions lacked the power to proceed because the structure 
and procedures violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions); 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (identifying that persons deemed enemy 
combatants have the right to challenge the legality of their detention before a judge or other 
neutral decision maker); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004) (providing federal courts 
with jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus petitions by or on behalf of persons detained at 
the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); By the Numbers:  U.S. Prosecutions of Jihadist 
Terror Crimes Since 9/11, CTR. ON NAT’L SEC. AT FORDHAM L. (July 2015), 
http://www.centeronnationalsecurity.org/sites/default/files/CNS%20By%20the%20Nu
mbers%20-%20U.S.%20Prosecutions%20of%20Terror%20Crimes%20Since%209-11.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/N6SS-H9VV] (stating that 462 terrorism cases have been prosecuted in the 
United States since 9/11, the government has a ninety-one percent conviction rate, and 
appellate courts have consistently sided with the government in most every FISA related 
issue). 
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I believe it is time to recognize that Franks cannot operate 
in the FISA context as it does in the ordinary criminal 
case.  To pretend otherwise does a disservice to the 
defendant and to the integrity of the judiciary.  We must 
recognize both that the defendant cannot make a viable 
Franks motion without access to the FISA application, and 
that the court, which does have access to the application, 
cannot, for the most part, independently evaluate the 
accuracy of that application on its own without the 
defendant’s knowledge of the underlying facts.  Yet, 
Franks serves as an indispensable check on potential 
abuses of the warrant process, and means must be found 
to keep Franks from becoming a dead letter in the FISA 
context.  The responsibility for identifying a solution lies 
with all three branches of government, but as the branch 
charged with applying Franks, the duty falls to the 
judiciary to acknowledge the problem, make such 
accommodations as it can, and call upon the other 
branches to make reforms that are beyond our power to 
implement. 
[ . . . ] 
My purpose in engaging in this discussion has been to 
acknowledge a problem that thus far has not been 
addressed as deeply as it should be by the judiciary.  
Thirty-six years after the enactment of FISA, it is well past 
time to recognize that it is virtually impossible for a FISA 
defendant to make the showing that Franks requires in 
order to convene an evidentiary hearing, and that a court 
cannot conduct more than a limited Franks review on its 
own.  Possibly there is no realistic means of reconciling 
Franks with the FISA process.  But all three branches of 
government have an obligation to explore that question 
thoroughly before we rest with that conclusion.60 
This conundrum Judge Rovner described might be fairly described as 
what is known in academic circles as a legal “black hole,” or perhaps 
better put, a “legal grey hole[.]”61  This issue and its consequences will 
                                                 
60 United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 486, 496 (7th Cir. 2014). 
61 See Andrew Kent, Disappearing Legal Black Holes and Converging Domains:  Changing 
Individual Rights Protection in National Security and Foreign Affairs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 
1030, 1034 n.23 (2015) (quoting the terms “legal black hole” and “legal grey hole,” and also 
attributing the creation of the terms to professor David Dyzenhaus who stated “there are 
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raise its head again once we get to Carl Schmitt, Clinton Rossiter, and 
Giorgio Agamben when we take up the discussion of Schmitt’s famous 
“state of exception.”62  Black holes, grey holes, the state of exception, and 
political theorists such as Schmitt, Rossiter, and Agamben are of little 
comfort to Adel Daoud, who currently awaits trial and would like nothing 
more than to be able to challenge the 2012 FISA search warrant issued 
against him by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”).  If 
nothing else, however, he accomplished something no defendant in the 
thirty-seven year history of FISA has done.  He was not only the first 
defendant whose counsel was judicially awarded access to FISA search 
warrant materials, but he also caused at least one judge from the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals to acknowledge the existence of a very real 
problem in national security prosecutions involving FISA.63  While this 
admission is probably of little comfort to Daoud, the significance of the 
above statements of Judge Rovner, for our present purposes, is 
considerable.  This is truly a remarkable opinion, and one deserving of far 
more attention than it has to date. 
In order to appreciate the significance of this opinion, some 
background on the case—and its relationship to the political fall-out from 
the Edward Snowden foreign intelligence gathering revelations, in 
particular, will shed light on our latter discussion concerning Carl 
Schmitt’s “state of exception,” politics, and the rule of law.64  On 
                                                 
some legal constraints on executive action—it is not a lawless void—but the constraints are 
so insubstantial that they pretty well permit the government to do as it pleases”). 
62 See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 1–5 (Kevin Attell trans. 2005) (providing 
that while the state of exception has been thoroughly discussed by many scholars, there is 
still no theory of it in public law); CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP:  
CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 32 (1948) (explaining that there is no 
greater need for the use of extraordinary measures to overcome economic distress than to 
avoid war); CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 5–7 (Thomas McCarthy ed., George 
Schwab trans. 1984) (describing this term as any kind of severe political or economic 
disturbance that requires the application of extraordinary measures). 
63 See Daoud, 755 F.3d at 486 (Rovner, J., concurring) (identifying that Daoud was 
presented with the same issue facing all defendants charged on the basis of FISA because to 
allege misrepresentations and ill will in a classified affidavit, he would have needed to read 
the affidavit). 
64 See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing that the 
ACLU would have never learned about FISA’s intelligence gathering operation had it not 
been for Edward Snowden’s unauthorized disclosures).  The court went on to say, however, 
that allowing a lawsuit based on revealing governmental trade secrets, including gathering 
telephone metadata, would open the door for any target of FISA to sue in any desired federal 
court.  Id. at 742.  In its closing remarks, the court stated “[t]he right to be free from searches 
and seizures is fundamental, but not absolute.”  Id. at 756; see also ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 
787, 826 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that the metadata program exceeds the scope of what 
Congress authorized and violates section 215 of the PATRIOT Act); OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
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September 15, 2012, Daoud, an eighteen-year-old from a northwest 
Chicago suburb, was arrested on a criminal complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, charged with 
attempting to detonate a weapon of mass destruction in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2331(a)(2)(D), and attempting to destroy a building by an 
explosive in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).65  The weapon of mass 
destruction was a fake bomb created by the FBI in its undercover 
operation, after Daoud had been discovered talking to people overseas via 
the Internet.66  Daoud was indicted on September 20, 2012, and shortly 
after the return of the indictment, the government filed a Notice of Intent 
to Use Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Information (“FISA 
Notice”).67  The filing, as is required by the FISA statute, provided formal 
notice that the government intended to “offer into evidence, or otherwise 
use or disclose in any proceedings in this matter, information obtained 
and derived from electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1801–1812 and 1821–1829.”68 
After receiving the government’s notice that it intended to use FISA 
evidence against Daoud, our firm filed a motion for disclosure of the FISA 
materials supporting the warrant request to the FISC.69  However, in any 
other criminal case, the government provides search warrant materials as 
a matter of course in routine discovery—without the need for a motion.70  
Then, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(f), 1825(g), Attorney General Eric H. 
Holder filed a bare bones affidavit stating, under oath, that disclosure of 
                                                 
STATES ATTORNEYS, supra note 45, at 9-90.010 (providing that the National Security Division 
shall be consulted before an adverse ruling is appealed in cases relating to national security). 
65 See Daoud, 755 F.3d at 480 (stating that the investigation began in May 2012 for the 
September 2012 indictment). 
66  The very interesting facts of the case and how the government went about its 
undercover investigation—including the use of an undercover agent posing as a terrorist 
who pretended to have contact with a radical Muslim cleric from Saudi Arabia, is set forth 
in this very detailed thirty-six page Criminal Complaint, Docket No. 1, United States v. Adel 
Daoud, (N.D. Ill.) Case No. 12-CR-723 (Coleman, J.). 
67 See Defendant’s Motion For Notice of FISA Amendments Act Evidence Pursuant To 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1881e(a), 1806(c) at 1–2, United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 
1:12-CR-00723) [hereinafter Defendant’s Reply:  Disclosure of FISA] (acknowledging that the 
government filed its notice of intent to use FISA evidence). 
68 Id. 
69 See Defendant’s Motion For Disclosure of FISA-Related Material and To Suppress the 
Fruits or Derivatives of Electronic Surveillance and Any Other Means of Collection 
Conducted Pursuant to FISA or Other Foreign Intelligence Gathering at 1–2, United States v. 
Daoud, 755 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 1:12-CR-00723) (illustrating that defense counsel 
argued that the information was improperly classified under FISA). 
70 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1) (reviewing the Federal Criminal Procedure Rule in regard 
to the government’s required disclosure during discovery). 
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such materials would harm national security.71  Under the FISA statute, 
this filing automatically triggers an in camera, ex parte procedure to 
determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully 
authorized and conducted.72  After review by the court, disclosure of the 
FISA materials can be disclosed to the defense “only where such 
disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality 
of the surveillance.”73 
From the time of FISA’s inception in 1978, disclosure to defense 
counsel had never been deemed as necessary; and no defense counsel, 
therefore, had ever been granted access to FISA materials.74  In a five-page 
order and memorandum opinion issued in response to our request on 
January 29, 2014, United States District Court Judge Sharon Johnson 
Coleman became the first to do so.75  In her opinion granting disclosure of 
the FISA materials, Judge Coleman stated that she was “mindful of the 
fact that no court has ever allowed disclosure of FISA materials to the 
defense,” she nevertheless found that in Daoud’s case “disclosure may be 
necessary.”76  Judge Coleman focused her opinion on the integral role that 
the adversarial process—the bedrock of the Sixth Amendment effective 
                                                 
71 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(f)–(g), 1825(f)–(g) (2012) (explaining the procedures for in camera 
and ex parte review by a district court and the suppression of evidence).  Holder’s affidavit 
reads in pertinent part as follows:  “[T]hat disclosure of an adversary hearing would harm 
the national security of the United States and the Court shall then review the FISA materials 
in camera and ex parte.”  Government’s Unclassified Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant’s Motion at 1–2, United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 1:12-CR-
00723); see also Brief of Appellant at 17−18, United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 
2014) (No. 1:12-CR-00723) (opposing the motion to suppress FISA information).  But this 
declaration itself, aside from the definitional issues already mentioned over the blurring of 
the lines on what constitutes national security, was not without its own controversy.  See 
Government’s Unclassified Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion, supra note 
71, at 29–30 (arguing how the evidence obtained from the electronic sources is admissible 
under the good faith exception).  As we pointed out to the Seventh Circuit to no avail, the 
government or whomever did not even get this declaration right.  Id. at 41.  Later in the very 
same declaration, Mr. Holder states merely that national security “could harm the national 
security interests of the United States.”  Brief of the Appellant, supra note 71, at 10. 
72 See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (“If the Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that 
disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United States, 
review in camera and ex parte the application, order, and such other materials relating to the 
surveillance as may be necessary to determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved 
person was lawfully authorized and conducted.”). 
73 Id. 
74 Spencer Ackerman & Tom McCarthy, Defence Lawyers Granted Access to FISA 
Surveillance Documents in Terror Case, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/jan/29/defence-terrorism-case-fisa-documents-
surveillance [http://perma.cc/KWA9-N5HA]. 
75 See United States v. Daoud, No. 12-CR-723, 2014 WL 321384, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2014) 
(granting Daoud’s protective order). 
76 Id.  
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assistance of counsel clause—plays in safeguarding the rights of citizens, 
noting that the legality of surveillance is best made as part of an 
adversarial hearing.77  Nor should it go unnoticed that Judge Coleman 
noted that the government had no meaningful response to defense 
counsel’s argument that the national security interest at stake would be 
jeopardized in light of defense counsel’s Top Secret/Sensitive 
Compartmented Information (“TS/SCI”) clearances from the Department 
of Justice.78 
As such, it is here that one can see the interplay between the “state of 
exception,” politics, and the rule of law.79  Even before Judge Coleman’s 
ruling, the Daoud case had attracted considerable national media attention 
due to a rather fortuitous confluence of events.80  First, the charges 
themselves were sensational to say the least.81  An eighteen year old’s 
attempt to blow up a bar in downtown Chicago, as well as the FBI’s 
participation in such a “sting” operation, were highly newsworthy and 
controversial.82  Second, while Daoud awaited trial, Edward Snowden 
leaked classified documents regarding the National Security Agency’s 
                                                 
77 See id. at *2 (elaborating on the order and the implications of the disclosure).  The 
argument that a district court’s in camera, ex parte review of FISA materials denies the 
defendant his or her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel gained no 
traction when raised in several other FISA related cases.  See id. (explaining that the court 
had no opinion on the constitutionality of FISA); see also United States v. Warsame, 547 F. 
Supp. 2d 982, 989 (D. Minn. 2008) (reasoning how the court’s ability to carefully review FISA 
materials adequately safeguards individual’s due process rights); United States v. Benkahla, 
437 F. Supp. 2d 541, 554 (E.D. Va. 2006) (holding the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel was not violated by the District Court’s in camera, ex parte review of materials 
pursuant to FISA); United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that 
the failure of FISA to require disclosure and an adversary hearing does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment). 
78 See Daoud, 2014 WL 321384, at *2 (“Without a more adequate response to the question 
of how disclosure of materials to cleared defense counsel pursuant to protective order 
jeopardizes national security, this Court believes that the probable value of disclosure and 
the risk of nondisclosure outweigh the potential danger of disclosure to cleared counsel.”). 
79 See id. at *3 (demonstrating Judge Coleman’s analysis of the FISA application and 
related materials). 
80 See Jason Meisner, Lawyers for Terrorism Suspect Take Fight to U.S. Supreme Court, CHI. 
TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/bolingbrook-plainfield/ct-
bolingbrook-terrorism-supreme-court-met-20150106-story.html [http://perma.cc/4ECE-
BER3] (drawing national attention because of the similarities to Edward Snowden). 
81 See Alexandra Clark, 18-Year-Old Charged with Bomb Plot, NBC CHI. (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/Teen-Charged-with-Trying-to-Blow-Up-Bar-
Downtown-169908976.html [http://perma.cc/8UWD-BPLY] (charging Daoud with trying 
to use a weapon of mass destruction and attempt to damage and destroy a building by an 
explosive). 
82 See id. (explaining that FBI agents had been tracking Daoud). 
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mass data collection program in June of 2013—a watershed moment that 
sparked a national conversation about Internet and telephone privacy.83 
Third, in a speech on the Senate floor urging lawmakers to reauthorize 
the now highly controversial FISA Amendments Act (“FAA”)84 due to the 
Snowden disclosures, Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA) used Daoud’s 
arrest as an example of FAA surveillance successfully thwarting an 
attack.85  When the prosecution continued to deny that FAA surveillance 
produced evidence in Daoud’s case, notwithstanding Senator Feinstein’s 
statement, a subpoena was served on the United States Select Committee 
on Intelligence, which Senator Feinstein chaired.  Counsel for the Office of 
Senate Legal Counsel, Morgan J. Frankel, responded to the subpoena by 
letter asserting the absolute privilege from compelled document 
production or testimony under the Speech or Debate Clause of the United 
States Constitution.86  Nonetheless, Mr. Frankel went on to write, without 
waiving Senator Feinstein’s or the Intelligence Committee’s legal 
                                                 
83 See Barton Gellman et al., Edward Snowden Comes Forward as Source of NSA Leaks, WASH. 
POST (June 9, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/intelligence-leaders-push-
back-on-leakers-media/2013/06/09/fff80160-d122-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/AP2D-TTR4] (demonstrating that Edward Snowden stole the PRISM 
program); Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine 
U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-
us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d97 
0ccb04497_story.html [http://perma.cc/Q79J-UQWM] (exposing the government 
programed named PRISM); Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps 
into User Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data 
[http://perma.cc/RKR7-SRFY] (explaining that the PRISM program collects various online 
user data). 
84 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2012) (permitting the Attorney General and Director of National 
Intelligence (“DNI”) to “authorize jointly, for a period of up to [one] year . . . the targeting of 
persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign 
intelligence information.”).  Though the FAA prohibits the government from “intentionally 
targeting[ing] any person known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United 
States,” the FAA can nonetheless sweep up the international communications of U.S. citizens 
and residents—and the Attorney General and DNI may authorize “mass acquisition” under 
§ 1881(a) that encompasses thousands or millions of communications even where it is known 
in advance that the communications will originate or terminate inside the United States.  Id.; 
see also Defendant’s Reply:  Disclosure of FISA, supra note 67, at 6–7 (explaining the 
government’s opinion on § 1881). 
85 See 158 CONG. REC. 168 (2012) (showing that Senator Feinstein stated that a “plot to 
bomb a downtown Chicago bar” was among those attacks thwarted using FAA 
surveillance—which unmistakably references Daoud’s case); see also Defendant’s Motion for 
Disclosure of FISA-Related Material and To Suppress the Fruits and Derivatives of Electronic 
Surveillance and Any Other Means of Collection Conducted Pursuant to FISA or Other 
Foreign Intelligence Gathering, supra note 69, at 1–2. 
86 See Defendant’s Reply:  Disclosure of FISA, supra note 67, at 2 (declining to comply with 
Daoud’s request for production). 
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privilege, that although Senator Feinstein spoke in support of 
reauthorizing Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
“Senator Feinstein did not state, and did not mean to state, that FAA 
surveillance was used in any or all of the nine cases she enumerated, 
including Mr. Daoud’s case, in which terrorist plots had been stopped.”87  
Instead, Mr. Frankel said that “nothing in Senator Feinstein’s remarks 
[were] intended to convey any view that FAA authorities were used or 
were not used in Mr. Daoud’s case or in any of the other cases specifically 
named.”88  “Rather, her purpose in reviewing several recent terrorism 
arrests was to refute the ‘view by some that the country no longer needs 
to fear attack.’”89 
Snowden’s public revelations permitted us to plead considerable 
allegations of FISA abuse that would not otherwise have been available.90  
To prove the value of transparency, his revelations were a treasure trove 
of disclosures of government abuse in the FISA process.91  One internal 
NSA audit obtained by Snowden revealed that the NSA broke privacy 
rules or overstepped its legal authority thousands of times each year, and 
that the FISC, which has some authority over NSA operations, did not 
learn about certain NSA collection methods until they had been operating 
for many months.92  In addition, pursuant to a directive from President 
Obama, and in an effort to control the damage in the wake of the public 
fallout from the Snowden leaks, the Director of National Intelligence 
(“DNI”), James R. Clapper, declassified and disclosed several FISC 
opinions, orders, pleadings, internal documents, and documents 
                                                 
87 Id. at 2. 
88 Id. at 3. 
89 See id. (quoting Senator Feinstein’s December 27, 2012, speech).  The author leaves the 
meaning, or lack thereof, of this statement to speak for itself.  The same can be said to the 
reference interjecting fear of future attacks. 
90 See id. at 3–4 (“The recent and ongoing disclosures of FISA related-materials weigh 
heavily against conducting proceedings shrouded by the veil of secrecy that the prosecutors 
request here.  These disclosures are material to the Court’s analysis for two principal reasons.  
First, they demonstrate that discussion of these once-secret issues in the public sphere is 
appropriate and, indeed, necessary.  Second, and perhaps a corollary to the first point, the 
disclosures of evidence how government attorneys have so repeatedly mislead judges—
either directly or through omission—in ex parte settings and why the disclosure of FISA 
materials and an adversarial hearing is necessary to guard against such misrepresentations.  
To appreciate this rather startling point, the Court need look no further than recently 
disclosed FISC opinions.”). 
91 See id. at 12 (showing that criminal defendants were first notified of the use of FAA 
surveillance in 2013). 
92 See Barton Gellman, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands of Times Per Year, Audit Finds, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wrld/national-
security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/33 
10e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html. [http://perma.cc/S8C3-HQH4] (showing 
how the NSA broke the law). 
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submitted to the FISC.93  The FISC judges themselves, providing a scathing 
indictment of the NSA’s electronic surveillance programs, detailed 
pervasive statutory violations, government misrepresentations, and non-
compliance with FISC orders.94 
In his opinion in In re Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], 
Judge Reggie B. Walton of the District Court for the District of Columbia, 
himself no novice or shrinking violet when it comes to national security 
matters, documented numerous abuses, writing: 
 “The government compounded its non-compliance with the 
Court’s orders by repeatedly submitting inaccurate 
descriptions of the alert list process to the FISC.”95 
 
 “In summary, since January 15, 2009, it has finally come 
to light that the FISC’s authorizations of the vast 
collection program have been premised on a flawed 
depiction of how the NSA uses BR [Business Records] 
metadata.  This misperception by the FISC existed from 
the inception of its authorized collection in May 2006, 
buttressed by repeated inaccurate statements made in the 
government’s submissions, and despite a government-
devised and Court-mandated oversight regime.  The 
minimization procedures proposed by the government in 
each successive application and approved and adopted as 
binding by the orders of the FISC have been so frequently 
and systematically violated that it can fairly be said that 
this critical element of the overall BR regime has never 
functioned effectively.”96 
In a FISC opinion authored by Judge John D. Bates of the District 
Court for the District of Columbia, Judge Bates called the NSA’s 
                                                 
93 See James R. Clapper, DNI Clapper Declassifies Additional Intelligence Community 
Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
OFF. OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.dni.gov/ 
index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/964-dni-clapper-declassifies 
-additional-intelligence-community-documents-regarding-collection-under-section-501-of-
the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act-nov [http://perma.cc/S8C3-HQH4] (illustrating 
the declassification of documents related to sensitive programs directed by President 
Obama). 
94 See, e.g., In re Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted] No. BR 08-13, 2009 WL 
9150913, at *1 (Mar. 2, 2009) (determining what is reasonable under the NSA surveillance of 
counterterrorism). 
95 Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
96 Id. at *5. 
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surveillance under the FAA “deficient on statutory and constitutional 
grounds.”97  In two of his highly critical opinions made public, the very 
national-security seasoned Judge Bates wrote critically: 
 “[F]or the first time, the government has now advised the Court 
that the volume and nature of the information it has been 
collecting is fundamentally different than what the Court had 
been led to believe.”98 
 
 “The sheer volume of transaction acquired by NSA 
through its upstream collection is such that any 
meaningful review of the entire body of transactions is 
not feasible.”99 
 
 “[T]he government acknowledges that the NSA exceeded the 
scope of authorized acquisition continuously during the more 
than [Redacted] years of acquisition under these orders.”100 
These FISA opinions and the general Snowden revelations were not only 
quite helpful to our argument in Daoud, but it should also be noted that 
they have been used to fashion several significant congressional 
modifications to FISA and FISC procedures, which were included in the 
recently passed USA Freedom Act.101  Because of the controversy 
generated by the Snowden disclosures, and Senator Feinstein’s comments, 
the oral argument before Judge Coleman was widely covered by local and 
national press.102  For the same reasons, Judge Coleman’s opinion issued 
a few months later on January 19, 2014, attracted significant media 
attention as well.103 
                                                 
97 Id. at *1. 
98 Id. at *9 (emphasis added). 
99 Id. at *10. 
100 In re Production of Tangible Things, 2009 WL 9150913, at *2–3 (emphasis added). 
101 See Jeremy Diamond, NSA Surveillance Bill Passes After Weeks-long Showdown, CNN 
POLITICS (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/02/politics/senate-usa-freedom-
act-vote-patriot-act-nsa/ [http://perma.cc/3GBJ-FRVS] (discussing that the bill’s passage 
resulted from the leak of NSA information by Edward Snowden). 
102 See Jason Meisner, Judge Rejects Looking into if Surveillance Program Led to Terrorism 
Charge, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 20, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-20/news/chi-
adel-daoud-hillside-bomb-plot-terrorism-20140120_1_such-surveillance-surveillance-
program-electronic-surveillance [http://perma.cc/H9ZT-FJN2] (expressing that media 
outlets and other political figures had commented on the Daoud case because of the Snowden 
exposures). 
103 See Jason Meisner, Defense in Loop Bomb Plot Case to Get Secret Terror Court Filings, CHI. 
TRIB. (Jan. 29, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-29/news/chi-adel-daoud-
fisa-court-ruling-20140129_1_adel-daoud-terrorism-prosecutions-thomas-anthony-durkin 
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The government immediately filed an interlocutory appeal to the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and after considerable briefing by the 
parties, oral arguments were held on June 4, 2014, including the filing of 
an amicus brief by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation urging affirmance of Judge Coleman’s order.104  After 
the oral argument concluded, Judge Richard Posner, speaking for the 
panel, ordered the courtroom cleared for a second, ex parte oral argument, 
which he described as a “secret hearing.”105  Ex parte hearings, usually 
held in District Courts on matters involving FISA and CIPA, are scheduled 
in advance and rarely attract the attention of the press.106  The Seventh 
Circuit, however, gave no public notice that it intended to conduct this 
secret hearing, which caught the press off guard and caused a bit of an 
uproar in the courtroom, with at least one reporter voicing an objection.107  
After the courtroom was cleared for the classified or secret oral argument, 
the U.S. Marshal’s Office came to the courtroom door and checked the 
identification of the government lawyers, agents, and other personnel 
who would be permitted access to the closed hearing.108  More than two-
                                                 
[http://perma.cc/37A8-DQ75] (stating that Judge Coleman’s order will require federal 
prosecutors to make available search warrant applications, which are usually not viewed by 
defense counsel in terrorism prosecutions); see also Ackerman & McCarthy, supra note 74 
(noting that Judge Coleman ruled Adel Daoud’s defense should be made aware of the 
beginning of the surveillance by the FBI and other intelligence agencies); Charlie Savage, 
Warrantless Surveillance Challenged by Defendant, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes/com/2014/01/30/us/warrantless-surveillance-challenged-by-
defendant.html [http://perma.cc/3XX8-XV5M] (addressing a Colorado resident charged 
with terrorism offenses challenging the constitutionality of surveillance without warrants in 
the United States and Judge Coleman’s ruling in Illinois); Adel Daoud Terrorism Case:  
Arguments on Surveillance Set in Teen’s Terrorism Case, HUFF. POST (Jan. 3, 2014), 
http://huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/03/adel-daoud-terrorism-case_n_4536652.html 
[http://perma.cc/7QG3-TT52] (discussing the Adel Daoud hearing and the arguments on 
expanded surveillance before Judge Coleman’s ruling). 
104 See Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties 
Union of Illinois, and Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Defendant-Appellee and 
Urging Affirmance at 25, United States v. Daoud, 761 F.3d 678 (7th. Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1284) 
(highlighting that the court granting the disclosure order protects the liberties and security 
of the nation). 
105 See Jason Meisner, Appeals Court in Chicago Holds Highly Unusual “Secret” Session, CHI. 
TRIB. (June 4, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-06-04/news/chi-appeals-
courts-in-chicago-holds-highly-unusual-secret-session-20140604 [http://perma.cc/ZTJ7-
E7CE] (noting that Judge Posner ordered the courtroom to be cleared after the arguments 
had been heard for a private session). 
106 See id. (expressing that in ex parte hearings, counsel are usually given notice of the 
hearing and the move by Judge Posner was unexpected). 
107 See id. (illustrating that the ex parte hearing not only caught the attorneys for the parties 
off guard, reporters also noted the unexpected nature of the hearing order by Judge Posner). 
108 Id.  
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dozen prosecutors and agents were counted as having advanced 
permission to re-enter the closed courtroom.109 
After the arguments, we learned that the FBI conducted a sweep of 
the courtroom to check for bugs or recording devices the morning of the 
arguments, and the Seventh Circuit’s courtroom staff “misinterpreted” 
this sweep and failed to turn on the recording devices that regularly 
record oral arguments for publication on the Court’s website.110  Thus, no 
recording or transcript was made of the public oral argument, although a 
stenographic transcript was made of the secret or classified ex parte 
hearing.111  Court Clerk Gino Agnello was later quoted in the press as 
saying that “his staff sort of freaked out” before the hearing.112  Agnello 
said the “[c]ourt staff who operated the audio recorder saw FBI agents 
sweeping the courtroom for bugs and ‘misinterpreted’ that to mean they 
shouldn’t record the hearing.”113  Because of this embarrassing, 
unprecedented flub, the Seventh Circuit ordered a second day of oral 
argument, which occurred a few days later on June 9, 2014.114 
In explaining the grant of a second oral argument, Judge Posner 
pointed out that recording oral arguments was not required by law, but 
due to the “high-profile case involving very serious criminal charges 
against the appellee” the Court was taking the “unusual step of ordering 
a second oral argument.”115  The description of the rather comedic aspect 
                                                 
109 See Michael Tarm, Arguments in Chicago Focus on Secret FISA Records, YAHOO NEWS (June 
4, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/arguments-chicago-focus-secret-fisa-records-010333044. 
html [http://perma.cc/R6LP-8RAB] (remarking that a number of people had advance 
clearance to remain in the courtroom for the secret hearing order by Judge Posner). 
110 See Kim Janssen, Court Staff Goofs, Fails to Record Hearing in Terror Trial, CHI. SUN-TIMES 
(June 5, 2014), http://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/7/71/164804/court-staff-goofs-fails-
to-record-hearing-in-terror-trial [http://perma.cc/A2NF-GD33] (explaining that the court 
reporters misinterpreted the sweep of the courtroom for recording devices, which lead to the 
failure of recording devices in courtroom to be turned on for the secret hearing). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 See Meisner, supra note 105. 
115 See Oral Argument at 1:51, United States v. Daoud, 761 F.3d 678 (7th. Cir. 2014) (No. 14-
1284), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/oralArguments/oar.jsp?caseyear=14&casenumber= 
1284&listCase=List+case%28s%29 [http://perma.cc/T73B-TZYS] (stating that the recording 
of the secret hearing was a misunderstanding and was not required by law).  It is worth re-
stating Judge Posner’s exact statement on the record: 
Now, I want to dispel what appears to be a misunderstanding, now, 
recording, whether it’s . . . electronic or stenographic, or what have you, 
of oral arguments in federal court of appeals is not required by law, or 
anything; and the recordings are not required to be made public.  Until 
our recording equipment was installed, no record was made by the 
court of the oral arguments.  And initially, the recordings were available 
just to the judges and their staff to kind of refresh their recollection of 
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of all this is not meant as an attempt to embarrass the Court, but instead 
makes the point that the introduction of national security issues—down 
to the very sweeping of the courtroom for bugs by the FBI or whatever 
other intelligence agency might have been involved in the sweeping—
introduces a level of tension that in addition to spooking the court 
personnel of the Seventh Circuit, cannot help but create an aura of fear 
that unnecessarily escalates the magnitude of the case and the seriousness 
of the very charges themselves.116 
Within one week from the second oral argument, the Seventh Circuit, 
in a panel opinion authored by Judge Posner, reversed the District Court’s 
grant of disclosure of FISA court materials.  Notably, the Seventh Circuit 
issued both public and classified written opinions.117  However, the 
significance of the court’s opinion, for purposes of this discussion, lies not 
so much in the reversal; rather, it is in the reasoning of Judge Rovner’s 
concurrence.118 
Judge Rovner discussed the impossibility of reconciling a criminal 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to a Franks challenge in the context 
                                                 
the oral argument, but eventually we decided to make the recordings 
available to the public as well . . . what this means is since we’re not 
required to make a public or indeed any record of oral arguments, we 
have no legal obligation to conduct a second oral argument in this case.  
But because the inadvertent failure to record uh occurred in the . . . its a 
high-profile case involving very serious criminal charges against the 
defendant, so we decided to take the unusual step of ordering a second 
oral argument even though the case itself is not being reheard, whether 
by the panel or by the full court, following the issuance of a decision . . . . 
Id. 
116 It is no secret that on days when national security cases are heard, courthouse security 
is often greatly enhanced.  On hearing days when spectators are anticipated, it is not unusual 
for the U.S. Marshals’ Service to have a bomb-sniffing dog walking the lobby or courtroom 
floor.  On many occasions, even an extra metal detector is installed outside the courtroom 
door and the bomb sniffing dog sits next to the detector.  Whether this is at the direction of 
the intelligence agencies or is intentionally orchestrated theater, is anyone’s guess.  As will 
be mentioned later, however, the author ascribes no ill will to any of the participants 
involved, including judges, court staff, security, court personnel, the U.S. Marshal Service, 
or the like.  As should be expected, working day in, day out, in the courts, relationships are 
regularly formed, and the relationships at the Dirksen Federal Building in Chicago in the 
author’s experience are, for the most part, exceptionally good and professional. 
117 See United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that it was the 
judge’s “obligation” to determine whether defense counsel was entitled to FISA material); 
see also United States v. Daoud, 761 F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that the information 
collected from surveillance should not be suppressed); infra App’x A (displaying the 
redacted, classified written opinion is attached hereto as Appendix A).  The thirteen-page 
opinion is worth a visual inspection by anyone who dares to think that the idea of a two-
tiered system is fictional.  Infra App’x A.  Of the thirteen pages, at least half of the opinion is 
redacted, rendering it meaningless to both the defense counsel and the public.  Id. 
118 See generally Daoud, 755 F.3d at 485 (Rovner, J., concurring) (showing the concurring 
opinion of Judge Rovner). 
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of a FISA search warrant, admitting that, without access to the FISA 
affidavit, a defendant could not identify misrepresentations in it—let 
alone establish if they were intentionally or recklessly made.119  Judge 
Rovner bluntly stated that:  “As a practical matter, the secrecy shrouding 
the FISA process renders it impossible for a defendant to meaningfully 
obtain relief under Franks absent a patent inconsistency in the FISA 
application itself or a sua sponte disclosure by the government that the 
FISA application contained a material misstatement or omission.”120  
Despite acknowledging that FISA arguably reads Franks out of existence, 
in the context of a FISA search warrant, Judge Rovner nonetheless decided 
that this problem calls for the “other branches to make reforms that are 
beyond our power to implement.”121  Put simply, despite her 
characterization of Franks as “a vital part of the criminal process that 
subjects warrant affidavits to useful adversarial testing” and “a 
meaningful deterrent to an overzealous law enforcement official[,]” this 
vital Fourth Amendment procedural due process issue—available to any 
defendant in any other type of federal criminal case—falls down the rabbit 
hole in the face of an out of court, untested declaration of the Attorney 
General that disclosing FISA materials or holding an adversarial hearing 
would harm the national security of the United States.122 
In addition to a constitutional procedural due process right slipping 
down this rabbit hole, it should be rather obvious that what is now only a 
hole could well turn into something the size of the Grand Canyon if, as 
mentioned earlier, “national security” can be so easily mixed up with 
foreign policy, domestic policy, concepts of traditional warfare, and 
existential threats to the homeland.123  More importantly, if Glennon’s 
double government theory is correct that the president himself or his 
attorney general are not truly making the decision as to what may harm 
national security, can that very decision be trusted?124  While it has not yet 
                                                 
119 See id. at 486 (Rovner, J., concurring) (describing how a Franks motion is based on 
material representations and omissions in a warrant affidavit). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 489 (Rovner, J., concurring). 
123 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text (exploring how national security can be 
mixed in various domestic aspects). 
124 What can readily be seen is the effort of the intelligence agencies to resist any effort to 
control their province.  This agency concern is not limited to defense lawyers.  A telling 
description of the issue is set forth in former CIA lawyer John Rizzo’s recent book.  In 
discussing the use of classified evidence in espionage cases, and the tension created between 
the agency and the DOJ prosecutors, Rizzo candidly acknowledges:  “We tell the DOJ that 
we will turn cartwheels to provide our intelligence secrets necessary to get a conviction, but 
we are going to push back hard if we think that DOJ is going for ‘overkill’ by putting sensitive 
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come to this on any grand scale, as might be expected with expanded 
foreign intelligence surveillance, the issue surrounding disclosure of FISA 
materials is beginning to appear in federal criminal prosecutions such as 
trade secrets and child pornography cases.125  To be clear, there is no 
prohibition against the use of FISA materials in traditional criminal 
prosecutions provided that the advance authorization is obtained from the 
attorney general, proper notice is subsequently given to the court and to 
the aggrieved persons against whom the information is to be used, and 
that proper minimization procedures have been utilized.126 
Nevertheless, who is to say that, much like the blurring of the 
definitional lines at the end of the two World Wars that in the modern, 
inter-connected, globalized neoliberal world we increasingly find 
ourselves in, all things economic will not become matters of “national 
security.”127  There is plenty of historical precedent for the exercise of 
                                                 
information into jeopardy when it doesn’t have to.”  JOHN RIZZO, COMPANY MAN:  THIRTY 
YEARS OF CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS IN THE CIA 67 (2014). 
125 See Notice of Intent to Use Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Information, United 
States v. Hailong, 4:13-CR-147 (S.D. Iowa) (providing notice to the defendant of 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1806(c) and section 1825(d)); Post Indictment Arraignment Calendar, United States v. 
Gartenlaub, 8:14-CR-173 (C.D. Cal.) (illustrating the use of FISA in child pornography cases); 
see also GROSS & NÍ AOLÁIN, supra note 55, at 232 (“The government is using its expanded 
authority under the far-reaching law to investigate suspected drug traffickers, white-collar 
criminals, blackmailers, child pornographers, money launderers, spies, and even corrupt 
foreign officials.”).  
126 See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b)–(c) (2012) (focusing upon the sections entitled Statement for 
Disclosure and Notification by United States in the § 1806 Use of Information statute); 50 
U.S.C. § 1825(c)–(e) (2012) (narrowing upon the sections entitled Statement for Disclosure, 
Notification by United States, and Notification by States or Political Subdivisions within the 
general section 1825 Use of Information statute).  Further, FISA expressly states that the 
government is not required to minimize information that is “evidence of a crime” whether 
or not it is also foreign intelligence information.  See id. § 1801(h) (illustrating the definition 
of minimization procedures with regard to electronic surveillance); 50 U.S.C. § 1821(4) (2012) 
(providing the definition of minimization procedures for physical searches); see also United 
States v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300, 1307 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the appellant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights had not been violated). 
127 See WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS:  NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION 22 
(2015) (relaying the dire consequences to democracy of a neoliberal rationale in a globalized 
world).  While the scope of Professor Brown’s work is beyond the confines of an article such 
as this one, a pair of chapters, in particular, entitled “Neoliberalism’s Remaking of State and 
Subject” and “Law and Legal Reason,” may instruct.  As Professor Brown states: 
As both individual and state become projects of management, rather 
than rule, as an economic framing and economic ends replace political 
ones, a range of concerns become subsumed to the project of capital 
enhancement, recede altogether, or are radically transformed as they are 
“economized.”  These include justice (and its subelements, such as liberty, 
equality, fairness), individual and popular sovereignty, and the rule of law.  
They also include the knowledge and the cultural orientation relevant 
to even the most modes practices of democratic citizenship. 
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emergency powers in the economic realm as was evidenced by the New 
Deal’s response to the Great Depression, and President Roosevelt’s 
attempts to take control over American industry for the World War II war 
effort.128  Is it too much to dare to suggest that the day might soon come 
when traditional economic fraud prosecutions—for example, matters 
involving commodities fraud at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, or bid-
rigging on a military transport plane being built by the Boeing 
Corporation headquartered in Chicago—could easily become “national 
security” prosecutions? 
Thus, the question that begs answering is:  do we wish to waive a 
judicial white flag in surrendering any meaningful role of the judiciary in 
matters merely alleged to involve national security, if that definition can 
be dictated by the Attorney General, his Assistant Attorney General of the 
National Security Division, the Director of National Intelligence, or 
whomever actually makes the decision?129  Most certainly, there is plenty 
of history and precedent to answer in the affirmative.  However, then we 
must ask whether we have the courage to admit it.  This  answer might 
not sit well with those fellow citizens, politicians, judges and lawyers with 
strong Madisonian attachments to links to our imagined past grandeur, 
filled as it is with more pomp and historical symbolism than substance.130 
                                                 
Id. (emphasis added). 
128 See Roger I. Roots, Government by Permanent Emergency:  The Forgotten History of the New 
Deal Constitution, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 259, 259–60 (2000) (detailing some of the New Deal’s 
impact on America). 
129 See GROSS & NÍ AOLÁIN, supra note 55, at 232 (discussing the effects on the judiciary 
when the definition of national security can be changed).  This definitional problem is at the 
heart of our following discussion of Schmitt, sovereignty, the “state of exception,” and not 
coincidentally “dictatorship.”  For but one observation along the same lines: 
The difficulties of distinguishing between economic and violent 
emergencies are part of a bigger problem of definitions.  Exigencies 
provoke the use of emergency powers by governmental authorities.  The 
vast scope of such powers and their ability to interfere with 
fundamental individual rights and civil liberties and to all 
governmental regulation of virtually all aspects of human activity—as 
well as the possibility of their abuse—emphasize the pressing need for 
clearly defining the situations in which they may be invoked.  Yet, 
defining what constitutes a “state of emergency” is no easy task . . . . 
Id. at 5. 
130 To be fair, my pessimism may well be overstated, as can often admittedly be the case 
from the vantage point of the courtroom floor.  There are certainly many legal scholars in 
addition to Judge Posner who would disagree that the sky is anywhere near falling or, I am 
sure, that we are developing a two-tiered system of criminal justice in the federal courts.  As 
noted earlier, Professor Kent’s recent article on the disappearance of black holes certainly 
views the glass as becoming more full than empty insofar as individual rights are concerned.  
See Kent, supra note 61, at 1030, 1034 n.23 (reviewing Kent’s analysis of the black hole 
phenomenon).  As also can be gleaned from Professor Kent’s article, he has considerable 
academic scholarly support that things may in fact be getting better, including Jack 
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IV.  ARE WE IN A PERMANENT STATE OF EXCEPTION OR CAN WE AT LEAST 
HAVE THE ADULT CONVERSATIONS PROFESSORS LEVINSON AND GLENNON 
URGE OUTSIDE THE ACADEMY 
Procedural constitutional questions, in the relatively small amount of 
terrorist trials in the federal courts, pale by comparison to the risks the 
executive branch and its intelligence agencies face in their obligation to 
keep the nation safe.131  It is certainly not suggested that those less 
concerned with civil liberties are no less genuinely dedicated or sincere in 
their motives.  Like Professor Glennon, I readily admit that most 
individuals involved in the everyday prosecution of federal criminal 
cases, national security or otherwise, try to maintain every bit as much 
faithfulness to the system.  However, the structural issues Glennon raises 
in his theory of double government go far beyond the good faith or 
sincerity of the lawyers or judges involved in the everyday workings of 
the system.  Just as I appreciated the help when the Seventh Circuit panel 
suggested at the second oral argument in Daoud that its secret session was 
for the benefit of the defense lawyers, it is nothing personal to ask instead 
to be able to do it myself for the sake of the adversarial system.132  In 
addition to chiding the growing lack of oversight of the Trumanites by the 
three Madisonian institutions, Professor Glennon does not spare any 
criticism on the citizenry itself, if one might still call the modern United 
States electorate “citizens.”133 
Glennon does not believe there is any risk of sudden despotism in this 
country, any more than I fear the sudden implementation of a Star 
                                                 
Goldsmith, Robert Chesney, Joseph Landau, Richard Pildes and Samuel Issacharoff’s similar 
optimism in the context of other national security issues.  Id. at 1034–35.  In fact, Professor 
Kent refers to the fact that Professor Dyzenhaus himself, “who focuses primarily on the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, sees evidence that courts are gradually closing 
legal black holes in those countries by ‘put[ting] a rule-of-law spine into the adjudication of 
national security.’”  Id. at 1034.  Whether this is truly “rule of law” spine, as compared to one 
of “rule by law,” remains to be seen. 
131 This is no doubt a gargantuan task and a solemn responsibility.  An issue that often 
arises in discussions with those in positions of such responsibility, however, is what might 
be best described as the “if you only knew what I know” phenomenon.  Having represented 
Ramzi bin al-Shibh in the 9/11 case, and the number of other domestic terrorism cases 
mentioned, I have come to get quite a bit of an insider’s perspective about the threat of 
terrorism post 9/11.  Suffice it to say, admittedly without the benefit of the President’s daily 
intelligence briefings and other wider inside intelligence, I am still waiting to hear something 
that would change my opinion that we have overreacted. 
132 See generally Oral Argument, United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 485 (7th Cir. 2014), 
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2014/rs.14-1284.14-1284_06_09_2014.mp3 
(providing a link to the audio file of Judge Posner). 
133 See BROWN, supra note 127, at 79–115 (giving a description of the ideological or 
rationality shift from homo politicus to homo economicus; in particular, the chapter entitled 
“Revising Foucault:  Homo Politicus and Homo Oeconomicus”). 
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Chamber or the Spanish Inquisition in the Dirksen Federal Building in 
Chicago.134  In fact, Glennon calls the risk of sudden despotism “trivial,” a 
bit more credit than I might cynically be willing to give to the state of our 
courts, but a reasonably fair description there nonetheless.135  As Glennon 
says, it is the very lack of fear of “an abrupt turn to a police state or 
dictatorship installed with a coup-like surprise,” that created “a false 
sense of security in the United States.”136  It is not the risk of a “strongman 
of the sort easily visible in history[,]” that Glennon thinks is apt to burst 
forth on the American scene, although it must be noted that Glennon’s 
article was written before Donald Trump emerged as an early leader in 
the 2016 Republican Primary polls.137  Ignorance, or more kindly, apathy 
of the electorate might instead be a greater danger.  This risk, Glennon 
warns, is a risk similar to the gradual structural incentives for the 
bureaucratic centralization of power in the hands of the Trumanite 
national security state.138  A greater risk than the strongman, Glennon 
submits, is the “risk of slowly tightening centralized power, growing and 
evolving organically beyond public view, increasingly unresponsive to 
the Madisonian checks and balances.”139  Glennon also cites the rather 
disturbing fact that in the twentieth century “some seventy democracies 
collapsed and quietly gave way to authoritarian regimes.”140  Glennon 
argues that this risk of collapse directly “correlates with voter 
ignorance[,]” for, as he puts it further, “the term Orwellian has little 
meaning to a people who have never know anything different, who have 
scant knowledge of history, civics, or public affairs, and who in any event 
have likely never heard of George Orwell.”141  Further, Glennon concludes 
his article with a poignant quote from Thomas Jefferson:  “If a nation 
                                                 
134 See Glennon, supra note 4, at 13 (referencing the notion of a “sudden despotism”). 
135 See id. at 112 (stating that there is only a “trivial risk of sudden despotism”). 
136 Id. at 112–13. 
137 Id. at 113; see, e.g., Dan Balz & Scott Clement, Poll:  Trump, Carson Top GOP Race; Clinton 
Leads Dems but Support Drops, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-trump-carson-top-gop-race-clinton-leads-
dems-but-support-drops/2015/09/13/7961a820-58c2-11e5-8bb1-b488d231bba2_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/8HJF-E3K6] (announcing the results of a recent poll showing Donald 
Trump leading the Republican presidential field). 
138 See Glennon, supra note 4, at 109 (concluding that the network within the federal 
government controlling national security matters evolved in response to “structural 
incentives rather than invidious intent”). 
139 Id. at 113. 
140 Id.  Glennon attributes this statistic to Robert A. Dahl and notes that Dahl pointed out 
that the collapse of the seventy democracies took place during “the century of democracy’s 
greatest triumph.”  Id.  Glennon also quotes Dahl as saying poignantly “the most disastrous 
decisions in the twentieth century . . . turned out to be those made by authoritarian leaders 
free from democratic restraints.”  Id. at 112. 
141 Id. at 113. 
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expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, . . . it expects what 
never was and never will be.”142  Glennon poses a final question with 
respect to what form of government might ultimately emerge from 
America’s experiment with double government.143  He then answers his 
own question by saying that the form of government that is likely to 
emerge is uncertain.144  Then, Glennon warns ominously, “[t]he risk is 
considerable, however, that it will not be a democracy.”145 
The same question, as to the form our government might take, is what 
causes me to ask whether we, as lawyers, also wish to accept the 
possibility of a permanent two-tiered system of justice in our federal 
courts.146  It is this same sense of uneasiness and the same sense of a 
gradual increase of governmental centralized control over the criminal 
process in my forty plus year career fighting courtroom “wars,” be it 
against crime, drugs, or terror that leaves me with much the same 
ominous sense of dread.  Again, it is not the fear of the Grand Inquisitor 
taking over as Chief Judge tomorrow that makes me nervous.  
Nevertheless, there is something horribly foreboding about being asked 
to leave an American courtroom in the name of “national security”—
despite my having even higher security clearances than most 
prosecutors—so that those prosecutors can tell the court in an ex parte 
non-public secret proceeding what transpired with respect to how they 
obtained evidence to be used against one’s client.  Conversely, there is 
something sickening to one’s sense of justice or fundamental fairness—
whatever that may have meant once before—to be provided with redacted 
discovery, transcripts, appellate opinions, or transcripts of proceedings.147  
It is for this reason that the Seventh Circuit’s classified opinion has been 
                                                 
142 Glennon, supra note 4, at 113.  Using the analogy of “Joe Six-Pack’s” ability to 
comprehend American football’s use of a nickel defense or whether to run a play-action fake 
on third down and two, Glennon explains that this voter apathy is neither unintelligent nor 
irrational, insofar as a single voter’s ability to determine an outcome of an election in any 
event, particularly in light of a lack of change in national security policy from one president 
to the next.  Id. at 108.  Calling the decision to run the play-option not much “conceptually” 
different than making the decision to strike a high value target driving with four unidentified 
co-conspirators in Yemen, Glennon posits that there is little obvious reason for one to become 
informed:  “Why waste time learning about things one cannot affect?”  Id. 
143 Id. at 113. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Glennon, supra note 4, at 113 (“What form of government ultimately will emerge from 
the United States’ experiment with double government is uncertain.”).  Glennon also notes 
that the FISC “pioneered a two-tiered legal system.”  Id. at 54. 
147 See, e.g., United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2014) (responding to a 
discovery request, the prosecutor filed two responses, a heavily redacted version to the 
defense counsel and a classified version accessible only to the court). 
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attached in the Appendix for all to view.148  Perhaps if enough people, 
particularly lawyers, they, too, will be as concerned, but maybe not, and I 
would not bet on it. 
Returning to Daoud, most of our attention has focused on Judge 
Rovner’s concurring opinion to this point.  However, there are some issues 
in Judge Posner’s majority opinion that might give one pause to be 
concerned over the state of the adversarial process, if nothing else.  Judge 
Posner goes out of his way to comment upon a defense objection to the 
closed proceeding after the first oral argument.  He let it be known that 
our objection to the secret hearing was without merit as a matter of law, 
but also as a matter of fact.149  Judge Posner explained that the “purpose 
of the hearing was to explore, by questioning the government’s lawyer on 
the basis of the classified materials, the need for defense access to those 
materials (which the judges and their cleared staff had read).”150  The 
Judge went on to point out that:  “[i]n effect this was cross-examination of 
the government, and could only help the defendant.”151  With all due 
respect to Judge Posner, while he may be far smarter, I would venture to 
guess I am a far better cross-examiner.  However, the point is hardly who 
is a smarter or a better cross-examiner.  The point is that an encroaching 
two-tiered adversarial system, that the Seventh Circuit seems quite 
willing to countenance, does not bode well for the adversarial system to 
which we have grown accustomed.152  Judge Posner’s comment, that 
bodes perhaps even more poorly for the adversarial system, was in respect 
to the possession of security clearances by defense counsel.153  As 
mentioned, this factor had been a significant factor in Judge Coleman’s 
decision to permit production of the FISA materials.154  Judge Posner’s 
reprimanded Judge Coleman for thinking that “disclosing state secrets to 
                                                 
148 See infra App’x A (displaying the publically accessible, redacted, classified written 
opinion) 
149 See Daoud, 755 F.3d at485 (Rovner, J., concurring) (noting that the legality of an ex parte 
hearing has been affirmed by two other circuits and could only have aided the defense, as it 
was a cross-examination of the prosecution). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 See Glennon, supra note 4, at 54 (noting the two-tiered legal system consists of one tier 
“comprised of public law, the other of secret law”). 
153 See Daoud, 755 F.3d at 484–85 (holding that disclosing classified information to defense 
counsel, despite counsel’s security clearance, could harm national security). 
154 See supra Part III (explaining that Judge Coleman relied on the fact that the prosecution 
had no meaningful rebuttal to the argument that disclosure in Daoud was reasonable because 
of defense counsel’s security clearance); see also United States v. Daoud, No. 12-CR-723, 2014 
WL 321384, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2014) (discussing that the probable value of disclosure and 
the associated risks of nondisclosure outweighed the potential dangers of disclosure in 
regard to cleared counsel). 
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cleared lawyers could not harm national security.”155  “Not true,” he 
stated.156  Judge Posner’s explanation as to why this is the case  lets defense 
lawyers know where they stand in his hierarchy: 
Though it is certainly highly unlikely that Daoud’s 
lawyers would, Snowden-like, publicize classified 
information in violation of federal law, they might in their 
zeal to defend their client, to whom they owe a duty of 
candid communication, or misremembering what is 
classified and what is not, inadvertently say things that 
would provide clues to classified material.157 
His statement needs to be considered in the context of the number of 
people deemed trustworthy enough to be allowed in the closed hearing 
after clearing the courtroom.158  As previously mentioned, “about a 
dozen” prosecutors and government agents were permitted back into the 
courtroom.159  Then, add to that the number of court personnel given 
clearances to assist the judges in reading the materials, which leaves one 
to guess that at least thirty-five or forty people must have been deemed 
trustworthy enough to attend the secret hearing.160 
Nevertheless, this fact maybe not be the most frightening prospect of 
all.  As Glennon suggests of the citizenry, maybe lawyers themselves have 
also reached the point that no one cares—or that the truth is that lawyers, 
like the rest of the citizenry, are more concerned about their safety than 
their liberty, as is so often suggested.161  For this reason, Professor 
Levinson’s question about whether one can have “an adult conversation” 
about Carl Schmitt’s “state of exception” must be answered, since this 
question seems to also be at the root of Professor Glennon’s question as to 
                                                 
155 Daoud, 755 F.3d at 484. 
156 Id. 
157 Id.  Prosecutors, agents, or court personal presumably must be more trustworthy based 
upon their lack of zealousness.  Many might question this conclusion. 
158 See Meisner, supra note 105 (referencing the amount of individuals including the U.S. 
Attorney and about a dozen FBI agents and DOJ officials allowed to stay in the courtroom 
for the secret hearing after reporters, Durkin, and his co-counsel were asked to leave). 
159 Id. 
160 See id. (explaining who attended the secret meeting). 
161 See Glennon, supra note 4, at 93 (suggesting that the public is largely content with the 
“tradeoffs between liberty and security”).  As just but one possibly telling vignette, the 
author was having a casual conversation with a well-educated, wealthy retired 
businessperson at a recent party.  When the topic of closing Guantanamo came up, and the 
author mentioned having been there multiple times and the staggering average per-capita 
cost of each detainee, as compared to the costs in the BOP, the gentleman promptly stormed 
off suggesting that there was a simple solution to that problem:  “Fill Guantanamo with more 
prisoners.” 
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what form of government we inherited.162  The question might also be 
phrased as what form our court system must take in a constitutional 
democracy that finds itself in the midst of a perpetual emergency in an 
increasingly global neoliberal world still operating among competing 
issues of classic liberalism and nationalism.163 
It may just well be that the success of the War on Terror’s 
demagoguery might be explained by far more difficult problems than 
even double government, the lack of collective judicial courage, other 
Madisonian checks and balances, or a combination of all of the above.164  
While this explanation is hardly meant to excuse judicial acquiescence of 
oversight where oversight is often well due, the fear monger demagogues 
might instead be said to be winning based upon the same structural 
incentives Professor Glennon so successfully describes as causing such a 
centralized government power in the hands of the Trumanites in the first 
place.165  For the same reason that one might come to distrust whether the 
Attorney General himself or his prosecutors in the field are calling the 
shots in domestic national security prosecutions, one might also come to 
question whether we have become a nation dedicated to rule by law as 
compared to a nation dedicated to the rule of law.”166  This structural 
                                                 
162 See id. at 113 (stating there is uncertainty as to what form of government will emerge 
from the United States’ experiment with double government); Levinson, supra note 10, at 
721, 748 (discussing the public emergencies that are considered “states of exception”). 
163 See Glennon, supra note 4, at 113 (forming a judicial take on Glennon’s statement that 
questioned what form of government will materialize during changing times).  Much to his 
credit, however, Judge Posner does not shy away from engaging in this adult conversation 
and publicly discussed his views on national security and emergency powers.  See generally 
RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY 35–36 (2006) (pointing out that most judges are not experts when it comes to 
national security matters, and this lack of knowledge combined with “the judges’ ideology, 
temperament, and intuition about relative risks” might result in the courts deferring to the 
executive branch, which generally possesses expertise in national security matters or the 
judges might be inclined “to take an adversary stance”).  So, too, did former Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in his pre-9/11 book on emergency powers.  See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 
ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 224–25 (1998) (discussing judicial restraint in wartime and the need 
for courts to pay careful attention to the legal basis for government action curtailing civil 
liberty). 
164 See Glennon, supra note 4, at 18, 55 (discussing the Madisonian checks and balances 
model along with the judiciary not having “a will of its own” in the context of a double 
government). 
165 See id. at 26–28, 38, 109 (discussing the evolved centralized government perpetuated by 
the Trumanites’ along with their “incentive to exaggerate risks and pander to public 
fears . . . in order to protect themselves from criticism”). 
166 See DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing the distinction between “rule by law” and 
“the rule of law”).  Professor Dyzenhaus defines “rule by law” as the “use of law as a brute 
instrument to achieve the ends of those with political power;” as opposed to “the rule of law” 
as “the constraints which normative conceptions of the rule of law place on the instrumental 
use of law.”  Id.  Dyzenhaus suggests that recent attempts by academics in the United States 
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problem may be one larger and more disquieting than any of us care to 
admit—particularly for those of us who thought we were devoting our 
careers to the, so called, “rule of law.”167 
In the academic world of political and legal theorists, the question is 
more commonly known as the problem of “the state of exception.”168  
These words owe their origin to the famous Weimar Germany jurist, Carl 
Schmitt, who put forth its definition in his 1933 classic, Political Theology.169  
Schmitt began the work by bluntly declaring that the “[s]overeign is he 
who decides on the exception.”170  Early on, Schmitt notes that there is 
little argument in the abstract about sovereignty being the highest power 
of a state, but the arguments start over its concrete application.171  That is, 
the question becomes “who decides in a situation of conflict what 
constitutes the public interest or interest of the state, public safety and 
order, le salut public, and so on.”172  Schmitt’s answer, in rather simplistic 
terms for present purposes, is that a situation of extreme peril to the very 
existence of the state itself “cannot be circumscribed factually and made 
to conform to a preformed law.”173  Thus, it can only be the executive to 
which this is entrusted, which leaves little space for judges, except perhaps 
solely to keep shoehorning the exceptions into some articulable semblance 
of the law.174 
The seemingly, very esoteric academic question of sovereignty easily 
bleeds into our everyday courtroom world, whether we like it or not, or 
intended it or not, when we start throwing around war rhetoric in the 
name of national security in a domestic terrorism prosecution as if the 
literal existence of the nation is at stake.  It is here—over the definition of 
                                                 
“to respond to an allegedly different post-9/11 world turn out to support [Carl] Schmitt’s 
view . . . that law cannot govern a state of emergency or exception.”  Id. at 19.  Dyzenhaus 
warns that academics who do this might makes things worse “in much the same way as do 
judges who claim to be upholding the rule of law when there is merely rule by law.”  Id. 
167 See id. at 6 (discussing how the “rule of law” involves “constraints which normative 
conceptions of the rule of law place on the instrumental use of law” and that “the choice to 
abide by the rule of law a matter of political incentives”). 
168 See Levinson, supra note 10, at 722 (“‘[T]he state of exception tends increasingly to 
appear as the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics,’ it should now 
be clear that there is in fact nothing new about the notion of what Hamilton called 
‘exigencies’ or Schmitt viewed as ‘exceptions’ or ‘emergencies.’”) (quoting Giorgio 
Agamben, the Italian social theorist). 
169 SCHMITT, supra note 9, at 1. 
170 Id. 
171 See id. at 6 (“About an abstract concept there will in general be no argument, least of all 
in the history of sovereignty.  What is argued about is the concrete application[.]”). 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 See id. (discussing who will make decisions when a country is facing a “situation of 
conflict” when the exception is not codified). 
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“existential” threats—that seem to have taken us so quickly off the tracks 
since 9/11.175  If I read Professor Levinson correctly—along with Schmitt, 
Rossiter and Agamben—it is this very complex sovereignty question of 
the “state of exception” that requires serious thought and consideration.176  
Like Glennon, Levinson concludes his 2006 Symposium Article for the 
Georgia Law Review, entitled Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent 
Exception, with a sobering question as to whether it is even possible to have 
“an adult conversation” about this issue, the seriousness of which he sets 
forth in no uncertain terms: 
We are, I believe, at a crossroads in American 
constitutional development.  The United States—
justifiably—feels itself threatened by attack, and we have 
an administration in power that is both stunningly 
ambitious with regard to its view of executive power and 
almost contemptuous of the claims of any other 
institutions or of the citizenry to engage in independent 
constitutional judgment.  It is naïve to regard the 
Constitution as speaking clearly to the resolution of such 
dilemmas.  This decision must be our own as to the kind 
of political order in which we wish to live.177 
Levinson warns that this discussion of emergency powers or the “state of 
exception” is “ultimately a profoundly political one, with law, at least as 
traditionally conceived, having relatively little to do with the resolution of 
                                                 
175 See Daniel R. Williams, After the Gold Rush—Hamdi, 9/11, and the Dark Side of the 
Enlightenment, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 341, 355–56 (2007) (claiming the United States faces no 
real existential threat). 
176 See Levinson, supra note 10, at 722, 748, 751 (discussing the importance of having a 
successful conversation regarding constitutional fundamentals when the United States feels 
threatened by attack); see also AGAMBEN, supra note 62, at 2 (arguing “the state of exception” 
appear to increasingly be a dominant government paradigm in contemporary politics, which 
threatens to dramatically change the structure of traditional distinctions between 
constitutional forms); ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 288 (“[A] great emergency in the life of a 
constitutional democracy will be more easily mastered by the government if dictatorial forms 
are to some degree substituted for democratic, and if the executive branch is empowered to 
take strong action without an excess of deliberation and compromise.”); SCHMITT, supra note 
9, at 6 (explaining the exception can be described as a situation of extreme peril that 
endangers the state’s existence).  Levinson mentions both authors prominently and each 
merits a full read in their own right.  See generally Levinson, supra note 10, at 722 (mentioning 
both Schmitt and Agamben along with their theory on the state of exception).  As noted by 
Levinson, in commenting on Rossiter’s distinctly Schmittian overtones, the book itself was 
“perhaps telling[], . . . republished after a half-century in 2002 with a cover picture showing 
the burning Twin Towers juxtaposed with a seemingly burning Constitution . . . .”  Id. at 739. 
177 Levinson, supra note 10, at 748. 
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any truly live controversy.”178  Phrased differently in the context of 
discussing the use of torture, Levinson asks:  “To what extent should the 
President—and those subject to presidential command—view 
themselves . . . bound by . . . legal norms, or are such constraints better 
defined only as political?”179  Furthermore, Levinson, points out that 
Schmitt’s “state of exception” was nothing new at the time in Weimar 
Germany, and similar emergency concepts have a lineage to the 
dictatorships of ancient Rome, and can find support in the “exigencies” 
mentioned in The Federalist by Alexander Hamilton.180  In explaining his 
title’s reference to “permanent emergency,” Levinson goes on to suggest 
that “in some ways our entire history has featured the presence of 
emergencies.”181  Most importantly for our purposes, Levinson points out 
that “no single emergency has had the permanence likely to be the case 
with the ‘global war on terror.’”182  Eight years later, there can be little 
doubt about how permanent this global war remains.183  Worse yet, 
Levinson predicts that even if the global war on terror were to end 
tomorrow “there would be more than enough ‘emergencies’ to assure that 
the basic tension” of which he speaks would remain.184 
Thus, those deciding the permanence of the state of exception in our 
terror war can raise their heads in our courtrooms and alter the rules of 
criminal procedure based upon an unquestioned and untested 
certification signed by the attorney general, must become part of the adult 
conversation Levinson called for over eight years ago.  This question, a 
                                                 
178 Id. at 722, 736. 
179 Id. at 702.  In a separate 2004 article, Levinson cites a Schmitt quote to the same effect:  
“A normal situation has to be created, and sovereign is he who definitely decides whether 
this normal state actually obtains.”  Sanford Levinson, Torture in Iraq & The Rule of Law in 
America, 133 DAEDALUS 5, 9 (2004).  “All law is ‘situation law.’  The sovereign creates and 
guarantees the situation as a whole in its totality.  He has the monopoly on this ultimate 
decision.”  Id. at 9.  Levinson asserts that “[t]his is precisely the argument being made by 
lawyers within the Bush administration.”  Id.  Here Levinson refers to the controversial Office 
of Legal Counsel memos created to justify the used of the infamous Enhanced Interrogation 
Techniques.  Id. at 6. 
180 See Levinson, supra note 10, at 722 (illustrating the history of such concepts). 
181 Id. at 737. 
182 Id.  Levinson interestingly points out a number of earlier nineteenth century wars, 
including what he sarcastically describes as wars against “our fellow citizens between 1861 
and 1865,” or war against “myriads of American Indians who had the effrontery to resist our 
seizure of their homelands.”  Id.  He also wryly suggests that “[i]f we add to this the years 
featuring significant economic downturns or the occurrence of ‘natural disasters’ whose 
victims made a claim on the public fisc, I wonder if we would not find that years with 
proclaimed ‘emergencies’ outnumber placid years of ostensible normality.”  Id. 
183 See id. at 737 (“But it should now be clear that in some ways our entire history has 
featured the presence of emergencies, even if no single emergency has had the permanence 
likely to be the case with the ‘global war on terror.’”). 
184 Levinson, supra note 10, at 737. 
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trial lawyer submits, is not one better left in the hands of the academics 
and ought seriously be discussed by members of the bar as well as the 
judiciary, as the answer from a courtroom perspective appears to be that 
there is little doubt, but that we have left this sovereign decision making 
in the hands of our Trumanite Double Government—or more precisely 
our intelligence agencies.185  This should be every bit as disquieting as both 
Glennon and Levinson imply, for the very systemic reasons each 
suggests.186  If these agencies can decide the very scope and duration of 
the War on Terror, just as they can decide whether a court can choose to 
provide defense lawyers with FISA search warrant applications, then we 
might do well to think of ourselves as “ruled by law,” instead of living 
under a “rule of law.”187  As such, this statement is hardly a semantic 
academic difference.188  From the standpoint of Mr. Daoud, it is the 
difference between saying to him like Judges Posner and Kanne did:  “this 
is our law, Kid, tough luck;” as opposed to something like Judge Rovner 
said:  “sorry, Kid, we judges can’t help you because our hands are tied and 
this has to be fixed by someone else.”  Identical results, but at least the 
later is honest enough to admit the prospect of change. 
Likewise, the implications with respect to the role of the judiciary that 
Judge Rovner brings to the forefront in Daoud cannot otherwise be 
                                                 
185 See Glennon, supra note 4, at 30–31 (discussing the decision-making process within the 
intelligence agencies). 
186 See id. at 96–97 (stating that both authors see the systemic reasons and discuss the 
narrowing of the scope of the state’s secrets privilege). 
187 See DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that courts have power to choose to provide 
defense lawyers with FISA warrant applications).  The War on Terror finds its origin in The 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) signed into law by Congress on 
September 18, 2001.  Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(Sept. 18, 2001).  The AUMF reads in pertinent part as follows: 
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons. 
Id.  For a challenging exercise on the question of sovereignty and the role of the judiciary that 
could easily encompass an entirely separate article, one should read the very recent opinion 
of Judge Royce C. Lamberth of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
on the issue of whether Taliban detainees could still be held in Guantanamo based upon the 
AUMF in light of President Obama’s public pronouncements that the U.S. military 
involvement in Afghanistan has ended.  Al Warafi v. Obama, 716 F.3d 627, 631–32 (D.C. Cir. 
2013). 
188 See Defendant’s Reply:  Disclosure of FISA, supra note 67 (discussing the recent 
disclosures of FISA materials to the courts).  The difference according to Dyzenhaus is the 
difference between the use of law “as a brute instrument to achieve the ends of those with 
political power[,]” as opposed to the “constraints which normative conceptions . . . place on 
the instrumental use of law.”  DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 6. 
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avoided either.189  The seriousness of the judiciary’s role in “state of 
exception” questions are raised quite straightforwardly in Professor 
Dyzenhaus’ The Constitution of Law:  Legality in a Time of Emergency.190  In a 
chapter entitled “Judges and the Politics of the Rule of Law[,]” Dyzenhaus 
poses some propositions regarding judicial attempts, as he describes them 
much like we have witnessed in Daoud, “to pay lip service to the rule of 
law in situations where the rule of law cannot do any work . . . .”191  While 
commenting on the dismal British judicial record on wartime 
emergencies, but conceding that the courts could not do otherwise in light 
of the legislation, Dyzenhaus proposes, what might be said to foreshadow 
Judge Rovner’s very candor in Daoud.192  As he puts it, rightly so I would 
suggest, “for judges to try to pretend otherwise, to pay lip service to the 
rule of law in situations where the rule of law cannot do any work, is likely 
to make matters worse by giving to government the façade of the rule of 
law without the judges being able to enforce its substance.”193 
                                                 
189  See United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 482–83, 486, 496 (7th Cir. 2014) (describing that 
the federal judicial procedure is not always adversarial and not always completely public 
depending on the circumstances). 
190 See DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 60 (“[T]he state of exception is a claim about discretion 
writ large, but it depends on a claim about discretion in ordinary situations.”). 
191 Id. at 27.  Dyzenhaus, a Sessor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Toronto, 
makes these observation in the context of describing the dissent of Lord Atkin’s dissent in 
the British House of Lords case of Liversidge v. Anderson.  [1942] AC 26 (HL) 212–13.  The case 
dealt with the question of war-time detention in the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of 
1939, but sounds as if it could well be relevant to our current day Guantanamo cases.  
DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 23–27. 
192 See DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 27 (discussing the court’s power and record). 
193 Id.  For example, Judge Rovner cited and discussed a number of other FISA-related 
opinions that contemplated the same issue as that in Daoud regarding the availability of 
Franks.  Daoud, 755 F.3d at 483.  As she noted, these other opinions acknowledge the 
importance of a defendant’s right to a Franks hearing, but insisted nonetheless “that 
defendants must somehow make the same preliminary showing . . . that Franks would 
require in the usual criminal case.”  Id. at 490–91; see, e.g., United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 
141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (expressing sympathy for similar difficulty defendant would have 
in attempting to show case was so complex that disclosure of FISA materials is warranted); 
United States v. Alwan, 2012 WL 399154, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2012) (“Hammadi cannot 
offer any proof that statements in the FISA applications were false or were deliberately or 
recklessly made because Hammadi has not been able to examine the applications.  The Court 
is cognizant of the substantial difficulties Hammadi has encountered in trying to assert a 
Franks violation.”); United States v. Mehanna, 2011 WL 3652524, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 
2011) (“The Court recognizes the defendant’s difficulty in making such a preliminary 
showing where the defendant has no access to the confidential FISA-related documents 
here.”); United States v. Kashmiri, 2010 WL 4705159, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2010) (“The 
Court recognizes the frustrating position from which Defendant must argue for a Franks 
hearing.  Franks provides an important Fourth Amendment safeguard to scrutinize the 
underlying basis for probable cause in a search warrant.  The requirements to obtain a 
hearing, however, are seemingly unattainable by Defendant.”); United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 
531 F. Supp. 2d. 299, 311 (D. Conn. 2008) (“Since defense counsel has not had access to the 
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Dyzenhaus goes on to explain what he describes as “two further and 
no less serious concerns.”194  The first is that this paying of “judicial lip 
service to the rule of law in exceptional situations has consequences for 
the way judges deal with ordinary situations.”195  Quite consistent with 
our own courtroom experience, Dyzenhaus finds “that judges begin to be 
content with less substance in the rule of law in situations which are not 
part of any emergency regime, all the while claiming that the rule of law 
is well maintained.”196  Going further, Dyzenhaus posits that “the law that 
addresses the emergency situation starts to look less exceptional as judges 
interpret statutes that deal with ordinary situations in the same 
fashion.”197  These concerns, “[a]s a package . . . seem to show that once 
the exceptional or emergency situation is normalized . . . the exception 
starts to seep into other parts of the law.”198 
Considerably more academic scholarship exists on the issues 
surrounding Schmitt’s “state of exception,” that are not within in the 
limits of this article, and equally far beyond the expertise of this author.199  
One particular author already mentioned, however, is well worth noting 
                                                 
Government’s submission they—quite understandably—can only speculate about their 
contents.”); United States v. Hassoun, 2007 WL 1068127, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2007) 
(“Defendant’s admit that their allegations are purely speculative, in that they have not been 
given the opportunity to review the classified applications.”); United States v. Mubayyid, 
521 F. Supp. 2d 125, 131 (D. Mass. 2007) (“The Court obviously recognizes the difficulty of 
defendants’ position:  because they do not know what statements were made by the affidavit 
in the FISA applications, they cannot make any kind of a showing that those statements were 
false.  Nonetheless, it does not follow that defendants are entitled automatically to disclosure 
of the statements.”). 
194 DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 27. 
195 Id. 
196 Id.; see, e.g., Joshua L. Dratel, Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act:  The 
Growing Threat to the Adversary Process, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1041, 1045 (2007) (explaining that 
courts can issue appropriate protective orders to preserve secrecy).  For but one simple, but 
noteworthy development, protective orders regarding discovery are now demanded by the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois in every criminal case.  Daoud, 755 
F.3d at 481.  Judges are so accustomed to these requests that they are granted, as a matter of 
course, and most attempts to litigate them are met with judicial disdain as if it were 
comparable to civil discovery disputes.  Even worse, many prosecutors take the position that 
attempting to litigate a motion for a protective order will be viewed as lack of cooperation 
should one wish to receive credit for cooperation at sentencing. 
197 DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 27. 
198 Id.  This same phenomenon, in the context of U.S. courts post 9/11, has been labeled by 
some commentators and practitioners as “seepage.”  See Stephen I. Valdeck, Normalizing 
Guantánamo, 48 AM CRIM. L. REV. 1547, 1547 (2011)  (“Over the past decade, a growing chorus 
of courts and commentators has expressed concern that doctrinal accommodations reached 
in post-9/11 terrorism cases might spill over or ‘seep’ into more conventional bodies of 
jurisprudence.”). 
199 See DYZENHAUS, supra note 6, at 34 (explaining that Schmitt’s book discussed the issues 
surrounding the “state of exception”). 
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again.200  The prolific Italian philosopher and political theorist, Giorgio 
Agamben, wrote a very relevant modern sequel to Schmitt’s “state of 
exception,” in a 2005 book of the same name.201  Agamben hits on the use 
of the metaphor of war by U.S. Presidents in the twentieth century as 
being “an integral part of the presidential political vocabulary whenever 
decisions considered to be of vital importance are being imposed.”202  
After discussing President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s use of war rhetoric 
regarding the use of extraordinary executive powers in a series of statutes 
culminating in the 1933 National Recovery Act, Agamben sets his sights 
on President Bush’s very same claim to sovereign powers in emergency 
situations after 9/11.203 
In reference to the U.S. PATRIOT Act’s authorization of indefinite 
detention and trial by military commissions, Agamben points out that 
“[w]hat is new about President Bush’s order is that it radically erases any 
legal status of the individual, thus producing a legally unnamable and 
unclassifiable being.”204  As if to predict a recent controversial opinion of 
Judge Royce C. Lamberth, of the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia declaring that a former Taliban detainee at Guantanamo cannot 
be released even after President Obama declared publicly on multiple 
occasions that our combat mission had ended in Afghanistan.205  Agamben 
calls the detainees “object[s] of a pure de facto rule, of a detention that is 
indefinite not only in the temporal sense but in its very nature as well, 
since it is entirely removed from law and from judicial oversight.”206  
Rather shockingly to our American sensibilities, Agamben goes on to state 
that “[t]he only thing to which it could possibly be compared is the legal 
situation of the Jews in the Nazi Lager [camps], who, along with their 
citizenship, had lost every legal identity, but at least retained their identity 
as Jews.”207  Even more to the same point, Agamben cites with approval 
the American philosopher and gender theorist Judith Butler’s assertion 
                                                 
200 See id. (“Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception.”). 
201 See AGAMBEN, supra note 62, at 1. 
202 Id. at 21. 
203 See id. (addressing the President’s sovereign powers in emergency situations). 
204 Id. at 3. 
205 See Al Warafi v. Obama, 716 F.3d 627, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (concluding appellant did not 
successfully establish that he was a “medical personnel”). 
206 AGAMBEN, supra note 62, at 3–4. 
207 Id. at 4.  See also, NIKOLAS WACHSMANN, KL:  A HISTORY OF THE NAZI CONCENTRATION 
CAMPS 626 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux eds. 2015) (“There was no direct trail from [early camp] 
Dachau in 1933 to Dachau in 1945.  The concentration camps could well have taken a 
different direction, and in the mid-1930s, it even looked as if they might disappear.  They 
endured because Nazi leaders, above all Adolf Hitler himself, came to value them as flexible 
instruments of lawless repression, which could easily adapt to the changing requirements of 
the regime.”). 
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that “in the detainee at Guantanamo, bare life reaches its maximum 
indeterminacy.”208 
Agamben goes into considerable detail discussing Carl Schmitt and 
ultimately disagrees with him over the place of the “state of exception” in 
the law or juridical order of things.  First, Agamben points out that “the 
state of exception,” in Schmitt’s Political Theology, must also be understood 
in the context of Schmitt’s earlier book, Dictatorship.209  Agamben shows 
that Schmitt first places “the state of exception” in the context of 
dictatorship, and that Schmitt then distinguishes between “commissarial 
dictatorship” and “sovereign dictatorship.”210  Then, Agamben explains 
that a commissarial dictatorship “has the aim of defending or restoring 
the existing constitution” while a sovereign dictatorship becomes “a 
figure of the exception” that reaches its “critical mass or melting point.”211  
Essentially, Agamben parts company with Schmitt’s use of dictatorship 
insofar as it becomes a means within the law or structure of a constitution 
so as to permit the sovereign to declare a “state of exception” to preserve 
the existential survival of the state itself.212 
This issue of constitutional dictatorship, mentioned earlier in our 
discussion of Professor Levinson, is not without its supporters and 
                                                 
208 AGAMBEN, supra note 62, at 4.  Professor Judith Butler is the Maxine Elliot Professor in 
the Department of Comparative Literature and the Program of Critical Theory at the 
University of California, Berkeley and the Hannah Arendt Chair at the European Graduate 
School.  Department of Comparative Literature, BERKELEY, http://complit.berkeley.edu/?page_ 
id=168 [http://perma.cc/G59L-QL7E]; Judith Butler-Biography, THE EUROPEAN GRADUATE 
SCH., http://www.egs.edu/faculty/judith-butler/biography/ [http://perma.cc/G59L-
QL7E]. 
209 See AGAMBEN, supra note 62, at 32 (stating that these two books create a paradigm for a 
state of exception that has fully matured into its current state). 
210 See id. (describing the difference between “commissarial dictatorship” and “sovereign 
dictatorship”). 
211 Id. 
212 See id. at 50–51 (elaborating on the state of exception).  Agamben writes that: 
The state of exception is not a dictatorship (whether constitutional or 
unconstitutional, commissarial or sovereign) but a space devoid of law, 
a zone of anomie in which all legal determinations—and above all the 
very distinction between public and private—are deactivated.  Thus, all 
those theories that seek to annex the state of exception immediately to 
the law are false; and so too are both the theory of necessity as the 
originary source of law and the theory that sees the state of exception as 
the exercise of a state’s right to its own defense or as the restoration of 
an originary pleromatic state of the law (“full powers”).  But fallacious 
too are those theories, like Schmitt’s, that seek to inscribe the state of 
exception indirectly within a juridical context by grounding it in the 
division between norms of law and norms of the realization of law, 
between constituent power and constituted power, between norm and 
decision. 
Id. 
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appears to have gained considerable traction in American legal and 
political consciousness around the time of the creation of the National 
Security Act of 1947—not coincidentally, at the very same time the United 
States was taking over the role of hegemon with its development of the 
Atomic Bomb.213  Much of the credit goes to the Cornell historian and 
political scientist, Clinton L. Rossiter.  In his 1949 classic, appropriately 
entitled Constitutional Dictatorship, Professor Rossiter does not shy away 
or apologize for the fact that the United States has the bomb and will use 
it to become the most powerful nation on earth.214  In his straightforward 
conclusion after an exhaustive study of the use of emergency powers 
throughout history by the United States, Great Britain, France, and the 
German Weimar Republic of 1919 to 1933:  “From this day forward, we 
must cease wasting our energies in discussing whether the government of 
the United States is going to be powerful or not.”215  The reason this is such 
an easy choice, says Rossiter with no holds barred, is because if the United 
States is not powerful, “we are going to be obliterated.”216  Thus, since we 
have no choice other than obliteration, Rossiter says the country’s only 
problem is to “make that power effective and responsible, to make any 
future dictatorship a constitutional one.”217  Not being bashful, Rossiter 
finally and proudly concludes that “[n]o sacrifice is too great for our 
democracy, least of all the temporary sacrifice of democracy itself.”218 
It is little wonder then, as was mentioned early by Professor Levinson, 
that Rossiter’s book enjoyed a renaissance when it was republished in 2002 
with a cover juxtaposing the burning Twin Towers and the 
Constitution.219  Before we take comfort in Rossiter that all is well, and we 
                                                 
213 See ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 314 (describing how the Bomb morphed the United States 
into a powerful positive state). 
214 See id. (stating that the United States will become more powerful or it will become 
obliterated). 
215 Id.  There is little that Rossiter says that is not straightforward, blunt, and hinting at a 
great deal of faith in democracy and the exceptionalism of the United States.  Rossiter begins 
the book by rephrasing President Lincoln’s question regarding his suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus at the outset of the Civil War for the modern, post-World War II total war, 
nuclear world in which he found himself after returning from the Pacific where he had 
served as a Navy officer:  “Can a democracy fight a successful total war and still be a 
democracy when the war is over?”  Id. at 3.  Lincoln had famously asked in July of 1861:  “Is 
there in all republics this inherent and fatal weakness?  Must a government of necessity be 
too strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?”  Id.  
Rossiter unabashedly answers his modern version of Lincoln’s question in the affirmative as 
being borne out by the “incontestable facts of history.”  Id. 
216 ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 314. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 See Levinson, supra note 10, at 739 (describing the cover of the book as a picture with 
the Twin Towers next to a burning Constitution). 
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are on solid constitutional footing, it is important to pay attention to 
eleven specific maxims Rossiter mandates for a successful constitutional 
dictatorship.220  If I read them correctly, at a minimum we are at serious 
risk of being found in violation of a majority of the maxims.  Two maxims 
require time limitations—if not a specific termination date—one 
specifically forbids the measures to be permanent in character or effect; 
and another requires that the decision to create a dictatorship never be 
placed in the hands of the people who will constitute the dictator.221  The 
latter concern dovetails exactly into the question of sovereignty at risk in 
a double government.222  Who is it, or in whose hands, we have 
surrendered our sovereignty, needs desperately to be discussed, 
presuming as all appearances indicate, that we continue to choose to live 
in the global terror war’s apparently permanent “state of exception.”223 
Rossiter’s discussion necessarily includes a review of his other 
warnings, especially for our purposes, his very first rule:  “No general 
regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be 
initiated unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of 
the state and its constitutional order.”224  While I have strong doubts about 
                                                 
220 See ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 298–306 (listing eleven maxims regarding constitutional 
dictatorships). 
221 See id. at 299, 300, 303, 306 (stating that the men constituting a dictatorship should never 
decide to create one; measures should never be permanent; a dictatorship should not last 
beyond its termination; and dictatorships should not be created without instructions for its 
termination). 
222 See Book Note, National Security and Double Government, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
447, 447 (reviewing MICHAEL J. GLENNON, NATIONAL SECURITY AND DOUBLE GOVERNMENT 
(2015)) (defining “double government” as a conglomerate of two institutions:  the 
“Madisonian” government that consists of three branches of government and the 
“Trumanite” network of contractors and agents that work for government agencies and 
divisions). 
223 See supra Part II (analyzing the idea that the War on Terror does not have an end in 
sight). 
224 ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 298.  The remaining maxims read in their entirety are as 
follows:  (2) “[T]he decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the 
hands of the man or men who will constitute the dictator[;]” (3) “[n]o government should 
initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific provision for its termination[;]” 
(4) “all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the 
government should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements[;]” (5) “no 
dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure altered any 
more than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis[;]” (6) “[t]he 
measure adopted in the prosecution of constitutional dictatorship should never be 
permanent in character or effect[;]” (7) “[t]he dictatorship should be carried on by persons 
representative of every part of the citizenry interested in the defense of the existing 
constitutional order[;]” (8) “[u]ltimate responsibility should be maintained for every action 
taken under a constitutional dictatorship[;]” (9) “[t]he decision to terminate a constitutional 
dictatorship, like the decision to institute one, should never be in the hands of the man or 
men who constitute the dictator[;]” (10) “[n]o constitutional dictatorship should extend 
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how indispensable the need was for the enormity of our post 9/11 
response, I could live with giving the intelligence community the benefit 
of the doubt that the threat of terrorism is as enormous as our response 
indicates.225  What seems totally wrong however, is leaving the 
implementation of it all in the hands of those same people as Rossiter 
warns.226 
Agamben arrives at the very same conclusion as Rossiter with respect 
to placing the juridical norm and the power to suspend it in the same 
hands.227  While Agamben approaches it from a bit different and more 
complex philosophical angle, his warning is equally, if not more ominous 
to our discussion. 228  Agamben minces no words in telling us:  “[W]hen 
they tend to coincide in a single person, when the state of exception, in 
which they are bound and blurred together, becomes the rule, then the 
juridico-political system transforms itself into a killing machine.”229 
V.  CONCLUSION 
After thirteen years and counting, there does not seem to be a realistic 
end in sight to our global war on terror and the changes it has brought and 
continues to bring to our legal system, as the recent Paris attacks while this 
                                                 
beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was instituted[;]” (11) “the termination of 
the crisis must be followed by as complete a return as possible to the political and 
governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorship.”  
Id. at 299–300, 302–06. 
225 See supra Part II (describing the intelligence community’s response to terrorism 
following the 9/11 attack). 
226 See ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 299 (stating that the decision to create a dictatorship 
should not be placed in the hands of the people who are going to constitute the dictatorship). 
227 See AGAMBEN, supra note 62, at 86 (concluding that a state of exception can function 
properly if the juridical norm and the power to suspend it remain correlated but distinct). 
228 See id. (displaying Agamben’s discussion of the state of exception).  Agamben puts it 
this way: 
The state of exception is the device that must ultimately articulate and 
hold together the two aspects of the juridico-political machine by 
instituting a threshold of undecidability between anomie and nomos, 
between life and law, between auctoritas and potestas.  It is founded on 
the essential fiction according to which anomie (in the form of auctoritas, 
living law, or the force of law) is still related to the juridical order and 
the power to suspend the norm has an immediate hold on life.  As long 
as the two elements remain correlated yet conceptually, temporally, and 
subjectively distinct (as in republican Rome’s contrast between the 
Senate and the people, or in medieval Europe’s contrast between 
spiritual and temporal powers) their dialectic—though founded on a 
fiction—can nevertheless function in some way. 
Id. 
229 Id. 
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Article was going to print sadly confirm.230  Thus, the urgency of Professor 
Levinson’s request for an adult conversation seems as every bit, if not 
more important today than it was when he called for it in 2006, and we 
have Valparaiso University to thank for renewing that very important 
conversation.  Now some eight years later, if nothing else, it is certainly 
time to ask for lawyers outside of academia to join the conversation.  
Perhaps then we might get more judges to join us as well, as the stakes are 
certainly worth it—double government or not, two-tiered systems or not.  
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the conversation, one thing is for 
sure, I would think—that is, I doubt very much that any of us will choose 
to leave our legal system in the hands of our intelligence agencies. 
                                                 
230 Adam Nossiter, Paris Attacks Spur Emergency Edict and Intense Policing in France, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/world/europe/in-france-
some-see-the-police-security-net-as-too-harsh-paris-attacks.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ 
7ULY-ZYQS] (“All over France, from Toulouse in the south to Paris and beyond, the police 
have been breaking down doors, conducting searched without warrants, aggressively 
questioning residents, hauling suspects to police stations and putting others under house 
arrest.  The extraordinary steps are now perfectly legal under the state of emergency decreed 
by the government after the attacked on [November] 13 in Paris that left 130 dead—a rare 
kind of mobilization that will continue.”). 
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